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Article
Identifying Government Speech
ANDY G. OLREE
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Speech Clause of the First
Amendment to mean that when the government distributes money or other
resources to private speakers, it generally may not discriminate among
speakers based on viewpoint. The government is, however, allowed to
express its own viewpoint, even if it enlists the aid of private parties to get
the message out, as long as the communication does not violate some
separate legal restriction, such as the Establishment Clause. Together,
these understandings form the core of what has become known as the
“government speech doctrine.” This doctrine signals that distinguishing
between government speech and private speech will become crucial in
many cases involving either the Speech Clause or the Establishment
Clause. While the Court has announced the distinction in general terms
and has decided cases based on it—including a notable case this term
involving Ten Commandments monuments—the Court has yet to announce
a standard by which judges can reliably identify government speech across
a range of cases. After examining several attempts by others to formulate
such a standard, this Article suggests that the Court has now identified
three basic types of government speech. Accordingly, the Article proposes
a three-factor test for identifying government speech, demonstrating how
the test could function as a unifying explanation of precedent, and a
uniform method of resolving future cases.

365

ARTICLE CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 367
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE ............. 374
III. THE BINARY APPROACH USING A SINGLE-FACTOR TEST............ 379
IV. THE BINARY APPROACH USING THE FOUR-PRONGED TEST ....... 386
A. THE TENTH CIRCUIT FORMULATES THE FOUR-PRONGED TEST .................. 386
B. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS THE FOUR-PRONGED TEST......................... 388
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS THE FOUR-PRONGED TEST ........................... 391
D. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT JOINS IN—OR DOES IT? ........................................ 392
E. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT APPLIES THE FOUR-PRONGED TEST
TO ANSWER “ONE KEY QUESTION” ...................................................... 394
F. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE FOUR-PRONGED TEST .......................................... 395
V. THE “HYBRID” OR “MIXED” SPEECH APPROACH ............................. 400
A. JUDGES WHO HAVE ADVOCATED THE “HYBRID” OR
“MIXED” SPEECH APPROACH ............................................................... 401
B. PROFESSOR CORBIN’S “MIXED SPEECH” APPROACH.................................. 405
C. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE “HYBRID” OR “MIXED” SPEECH
APPROACH MORE GENERALLY ............................................................. 409
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THREE KINDS
OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH ................................................................... 410
A. THE GOVERNMENT’S OWN INDEPENDENT IDEA ......................................... 411
B. A FORMAT CONTROLLED AND RESERVED BY THE GOVERNMENT .............. 415
C. A CLEAR LITERAL SPEAKER EMPLOYED BY THE GOVERNMENT................. 420
VII. USING THE THREE-PART TEST TO UNDERSTAND
PAST AND FUTURE CASES ................................................................... 422
A. EXPLAINING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS .............................................. 422
B. FUTURE APPLICATIONS—SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATES .............................. 430
VIII. CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 433

Identifying Government Speech
ANDY G. OLREE*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most familiar axioms in all of First Amendment law is the
general rule that the government is not allowed to restrict private
expression based on viewpoint.1 The axiom applies even when speakers
use governmental resources to get their message out. From time to time,
the government actually facilitates expression by private persons—for
example, by subsidizing a variety of speakers, by offering public land or
other property as a forum for those who wish to speak, or by providing
people some means of accessing a variety of private information sources
and opinions. In these and other similar contexts, government is not
allowed to deny access to public property or support on the basis of the
speaker’s viewpoint.2 The government may grant access to its aid
selectively, but the access criteria must be viewpoint-neutral.
However, government itself sometimes wishes to express its own
particular viewpoint, and it is generally allowed to do so. Governments
often attempt to influence behavior and thought, not only by coercively
penalizing certain behaviors or expressions, but by expressing viewpoints
designed to affect the social milieu or to persuade people to think and act
*

Professor of Law, Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It is
axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message
it conveys.” (citing Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972))).
2
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (finding that
government cannot restrict speech on the basis of viewpoint and that any restriction must be
reasonable); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001) (finding that a viewpointbased funding restriction was unconstitutional); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–31, 834 (“The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion
or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392–94 (1993) (finding that the government may control access to
a nonpublic forum “so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum and are viewpoint neutral”); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870–71 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (finding that the Board of Education has discretion in determining the content in school
libraries, but the “discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner” such that
certain ideas would be suppressed); see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 236
(2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]n extreme cases [one could] expect particular [book acquisition]
choices [by public libraries] to reveal impermissible reasons (reasons even the plurality would consider
to be illegitimate), like excluding books because their authors are Democrats or their critiques of
organized Christianity are unsympathetic.”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
587 (1998) (“[E]ven in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not ‘ai[m] at the suppression of
dangerous ideas.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983))); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
45–46 (1983) (noting that when governmental property functions as any kind of expression forum,
whether public or nonpublic, the government may not “suppress expression [in the forum] merely
because public officials oppose the speaker’s view”).
1
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3

differently.
Government then becomes one of a host of speakers
competing in the marketplace of ideas. Our notion of freedom of speech
has not demanded that the government abstain from such a role, nor have
we required government to endorse all viewpoints equally as it sends its
messages.4 In other words, most citizens would likely agree with the
courts that the government may send the message “Say no to drugs”
without offending the First Amendment and without having to send the
alternative message “Say yes to drugs.”5 Viewpoint neutrality is not
usually required of the government when it is sending its own messages.6
Hence, when courts examine viewpoint-based restrictions involving
governmental property or resources, one distinction makes all the
difference—if the speech is the government’s own speech, the viewpoint
restrictions are permissible, but if the speech is private speech facilitated
by government resources, viewpoint restrictions are generally
impermissible. Classifying the speech as either government speech or
private speech becomes a crucial question—often the crucial question—in
deciding these speech cases.
When claims involve the Establishment Clause rather than the Speech
Clause, identifying government speech is often just as crucial, although the
effects of the identification are reversed. In this sort of claim, someone has
alleged that the government’s message constitutes governmental support
of, or opposition to, religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Although private parties may send their own messages approving or
disapproving of religion, the Supreme Court sometimes interprets the
Establishment Clause to forbid the government from doing so.7 So if the
3
See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 5–10, 13–15 (1983) (discussing the “government’s increasing influence on
and involvement in communications networks”); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many
Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380–81, 1384–87 (2001) (identifying the
capacities in which government speaks); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government
Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 983–84, 986–87, 992 (2005) (arguing for greater transparency when
government is promoting a particular message).
4
See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553, 559–61 (2005) (holding that a federal
program that finances advertising to promote an agricultural product is government speech); Velazquez,
531 U.S. at 541 (“[V]iewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the
government is itself the speaker . . . .”); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (“[W]hen the government
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.”);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (noting that the government did not “discriminate[] on the
basis of viewpoint when it [chose] to fund a program dedicated to advanc[ing] certain [] goals”).
5
See DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“In
sponsoring Nancy Reagan’s ‘Just Say No’ anti-drug campaign, the First Amendment did not require the
government to sponsor simultaneously a ‘Just Say Yes’ campaign.”).
6
Governmental messages regarding religion may be an exception to this rule, at least sometimes.
See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
7
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“By showing a purpose
to favor religion, the government ‘sends [an impermissible] message to . . . nonadherents’” (quoting
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–10 (2000))); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S.
at 302 (“[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and
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message constitutes government speech rather than private speech, the
government may be violating the Establishment Clause.
Identifying government speech becomes more difficult as governments
become more and more involved in facilitating private speech, on the one
hand, and in sending their own messages, on the other. When a private
speaker uses governmental property or support as she sends her message,
who is really speaking? How can we tell? The higher the level of
governmental support and involvement, the more the speech looks like the
government’s own speech, particularly because governments now send so
many messages of their own, and because this government may have made
some affirmative decision to permit this particular speaker to use
governmental resources, a decision similar in many respects to the decision
to speak. But private speech does not become government speech simply
because the government allows the speaker to use governmental resources
to get the message out.8 Judges must distinguish the government’s own
messages from those of others, particularly in the contexts of Speech
Clause claims, in which a finding of government speech is a point in the
government’s favor, and Establishment Clause claims, in which a finding
of government speech is a strike against the government.
A uniform test for identifying government speech in these various
contexts seems desirable, but lower courts are struggling mightily to come
up with one. A salient example is the set of cases dealing with specialty
license plate programs,9 in which, for an additional fee, a state allows
motorists obtaining license plates to choose from a menu of unique designs
Typically, private
in lieu of the state’s standard plate design.10
Exercise Clauses protect.” (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990))); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600–01 (1989) (holding that the Establishment Clause prohibited a
county’s display of a crèche because by permitting the display under the circumstances, “the county
sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise to God that is the
creche’s religious message”).
8
See supra note 2 and accompanying text for examples of courts not allowing the government to
deny access to public property or support on the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint.
9
See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 862, 869–70 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that Missouri’s
specialty license plate program violated the First Amendment); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d
853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that messages on specialty license plates do not constitute
government speech); Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that messages conveyed through specialty license plates primarily represent private speech), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that specialty license plates represent government speech for the purposes of the Free Speech
Clause); Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 352 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that the court did not have
jurisdiction over a suit over a specialty license plate program that diverted excess charges to
organizations endorsed by the legislature); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794
(4th Cir. 2004) (holding that specialty license plates were neither purely government speech nor purely
private speech); Women’s Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 943–45 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding that individual residents did not have taxpayer standing to challenge Florida’s specialty license
plate program under the Establishment Clause).
10
For a discussion of various states’ specialty license plate programs, their general features, and
some differences between them, see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative
Discretion: The Example of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REV. 419, 424–41 (2001); Amy Riley
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organizations must apply in advance to the state for permission to add their
own design to the menu of options. Many states have approved a lengthy
menu of choices, but occasionally a state will deny a particular application
because of the viewpoint represented by the applicant group or its
proposed plate design.11 If the approved specialty plate designs are viewed
as government speech, a viewpoint-based denial can be upheld as a
governmental decision not to speak; but if the designs are viewed as
private speech using government property, any viewpoint-based denial is
presumptively unconstitutional, even though the plates are owned and
issued by the government. These cases have been giving federal courts fits
over the past decade. Two circuits have refused to decide such cases on
the constitutional merits,12 but the circuits that have addressed the First
Amendment arguments have employed widely varying analyses. One
circuit has viewed specialty plates as purely government speech;13 at least
two have viewed the plates as private speech;14 one has viewed the plates
Lucas, Comment, Specialty License Plates: The First Amendment and the Intersection of Government
Speech and Public Forum Doctrines, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1971, 2007–09, 2011–13, 2017 (2008).
11
There is some dispute in some of these cases as to whether the state’s denial was driven by an
intent to exclude a particular viewpoint or an entire subject matter. If (as the Seventh Circuit has
recently concluded with respect to Illinois’s specialty plate program) the state’s denial is truly the
product of a reasonable desire to exclude from specialty plates all points of view related to a particular
subject matter, the denial might be construed as viewpoint-neutral and is somewhat more defensible,
even if the plates are not deemed to be government speech. Compare Choose Life, 547 F.3d at 865–67
(concluding that Illinois’s denial of an application for a “Choose Life” license plate was founded in a
viewpoint-neutral state policy of refusing to issue plates for all groups expressing opinions on the
subject matter of abortion), with Arizona Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 971–72 (concluding that Arizona’s
denial of an application for a “Choose Life” license plate was founded in a state policy of refusing to
issue plates for groups weighing in on the issue of abortion because it was so controversial, but that this
fact demonstrated the state’s viewpoint discrimination, since the state’s statutes did not exclude
controversial messages in general or the subject of abortion in particular, and the denial was based on
the divisiveness of the proffered viewpoint). This Article, however, focuses on situations in which
viewpoint discrimination is present or assumed. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 623–26 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding viewpoint
discrimination where the state disapproved an organization’s proposed specialty plate design containing
a Confederate flag because of the viewpoint represented by the flag). In such cases, the crucial judicial
task usually will be to distinguish government speech from private speech. In other words, courts must
determine whether the viewpoint discrimination represents the government’s attempt to control its own
message or instead to disadvantage a disfavored private viewpoint.
12
The Eleventh Circuit has dismissed a specialty plate complaint for lack of standing. See
Women’s Emergency Network, 323 F.3d at 940. And the Fifth Circuit has held that the specialty plate
fee is a tax and that therefore the federal Tax Injunction Act forbids federal court jurisdiction over
specialty plate complaints. See Henderson, 407 F.3d at 352.
13
See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375–76 (Sixth Circuit) (holding that a “Choose Life” specialty
license plate was government speech because the state had “final approval authority over every word
used”).
14
See Roach, 560 F.3d at 868 (Eighth Circuit) (finding that “under all the circumstances a
reasonable and fully informed observer would recognize the message on the ‘Choose Life’ specialty
plate as the message of a private party, not the state”); Arizona Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 968 (Ninth
Circuit) (finding that specialty plates are private speech because the state did not “bear[] ultimate
responsibility for the content of the speech”); see also Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 621–
22 (Fourth Circuit) (finding, in a case decided two years before Rose, that specialty plates constituted
private speech); infra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that the Seventh Circuit has rejected the
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as a hybrid of both governmental and private speech, requiring the court to
impose a sort of intermediate scrutiny in evaluating viewpoint-based
denials of specialty plate applications;15 and one, claiming that “privatespeech rights are implicated” by the plates and denying that the plates are
government speech,16 has applied conventional forum analysis to the
plates—as if they are private speech—without saying whether they
constitute private speech or some form of hybrid speech.17 A clarification
of the government speech doctrine would surely aid in the uniform
resolution of such cases.
On the Establishment Clause side, the identification of government
speech can prove just as troublesome. For example, the circuit courts have
often been asked to identify government speech in cases involving
inanimate displays in city parks. One familiar bone of contention is the
nativity scene or crèche erected on public property during the Christmas
season.18 If a nativity scene is displayed on public property under
circumstances suggesting that the government itself was “send[ing] an
unmistakable message” endorsing Christianity, the display is forbidden by
the Establishment Clause.19 But if such displays are donated or loaned to
the government by private organizations, could they be viewed as private
speech and thus immunized from Establishment Clause challenges?20
Ten Commandments monuments, often donated to state or local
government by a private religious or charitable group, represent another
familiar type of inanimate display. Some circuit courts have struck down
such displays as violations of the Establishment Clause.21 The U.S.
contention that specialty plates were government speech and analyzed them using conventional forum
analysis as if they constituted private speech, but refused to say whether they constituted private speech
or hybrid speech).
15
At least two of the judges on the Fourth Circuit’s three-judge panel in Rose reached this
conclusion in separate opinions, although there was no opinion for the court. See Planned Parenthood
of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794–95 (4th Cir. 2004); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring in
judgment); see also id. at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring in judgment) (suggesting that specialty plate
programs “have elements of both private and government speech”).
16
Choose Life, 547 F.3d at 864 (Seventh Circuit).
17
Id. at 864–67.
18
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
19
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600 (1989); cf. id. at 601 (“[B]y prohibiting
government endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits . . . the government’s lending
its support to the communication of a religious organization’s religious message.”).
20
One circuit has suggested that donated permanent displays in city parks constitute private
speech in a public forum. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.2, 1050–52
(10th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132–34 (2009) (holding that the placement of a permanent
monument in a public park is a form of government speech); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995,
1002, 1004–06 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that permanent monuments were a nonpublic forum because
property was “not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication” (quotations omitted)).
21
See, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 481–82, 490 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
Commonwealth, by displaying a Ten Commandments monument, “emphasize[d] a single religious
influence to the exclusion of all other religious and secular influences” in violation of the Establishment
Clause); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 307–08 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a Ten
Commandments monument on city property improperly advanced or endorsed religion in violation of
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Supreme Court and some other circuits have held that governmental
display of such monuments is sometimes permissible, but the opinions
were not grounded in any assumption that the monuments constituted
private speech rather than government speech.22 Yet the Tenth Circuit held
in 2002 that donated monuments of this sort do constitute private speech.23
Reasoning from that precedent, a competing religious group later
convinced the circuit that a city displaying a donated Ten Commandments
monument in the city’s park is operating a traditional public forum for
private speech and must therefore also accept and display the group’s own
unique donation to the city: a monument to the Seven Aphorisms of
Summum.24 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit’s decision, unanimously holding that donated Ten Commandments
monuments constitute government speech.25 While clarifying the law with
respect to certain monuments, however, the Court did not venture a method
for identifying government speech in other circumstances.26
Lower courts are increasingly required to identify government speech
in a wide variety of free speech and religious establishment cases, and the
circuits are reaching a wide variety of conclusions about how this ought to
be done. The confusion has led some commentators to suggest that the
two-category approach itself is the problem. Following the lead of the
Fourth Circuit in its most recent specialty plates case, commentators are
increasingly calling for an end to the rigidly binary government
speech/private speech distinction, claiming that much speech falls
somewhere in between and arguing for the creation of a third category of
the Establishment Clause); see also Staley v. Harris County, 461 F.3d 504, 514–15 (5th Cir. 2006)
(holding that a county monument commemorating a local citizen and located on courthouse grounds
violated the Establishment Clause because it contained an open Bible and had been recently refurbished
for the purpose of calling attention to the Bible), vacated en banc as moot and unripe, 485 F.3d 305
(5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 647 (2007); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the Establishment Clause was violated when the chief justice of the state
supreme court erected a Ten Commandments monument, built with private funds, in a state judicial
building).
22
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (ruling that the display of a Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol did not violate the Establishment
Clause); Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a city’s display
of a Ten Commandments monument was permissible because, inter alia, “nothing apart from the
monument’s text suggests a religious motive on the City’s part”); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of
Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 776–78 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the city’s display of a Ten
Commandments monument did not violate the Establishment Clause because the monument made
passive use of the Commandments “to acknowledge the role of religion in our Nation’s heritage”).
23
City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1004–06.
24
Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d at 1047, 1050–55.
25
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009); id. at 1141 (Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment). See infra notes 299–306 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Pleasant Grove and the Supreme Court’s holding that the government speaks when it accepts,
embraces, and communicates a donated message.
26
See Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (“There may be situations in which it is difficult to
tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private
speech, but this case does not present such a situation.”).
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“hybrid” or “mixed” speech, restrictions on which would qualify for some
medium degree of scrutiny or an ad hoc balancing of the competing
interests involved.27
The hybrid approach is alluring, but in this Article, I will argue that it
leads to inconsistent results and that it may insufficiently protect free
speech rights; furthermore, I will argue, the hybrid approach is in tension
with the whole notion of government speech as developed by the Supreme
Court. I will also argue that, while the traditional binary approach is
preferable, the tests developed by some circuits to categorize speech within
that binary framework are flawed and likewise misstate the law. I believe
Supreme Court precedents can be distilled into the notion that government
speech arises in one of three basic ways. I will propose this three-factor
test as a preferable method of consistently identifying government speech
in both expression cases and establishment cases. I do not argue that the
Court has formally or intentionally embraced this test—only that the test
provides a useful way of understanding what the Court has done and
predicting what it will do. My purpose is thus to explain the results in a
variety of the Court’s speech and establishment cases, and also,
secondarily, to provide a few reasons why the Court’s approach,
understood in this way, might be preferable to alternatives.28
Part II briefly describes the development of the government speech
doctrine by the Supreme Court. Part III discusses one approach used by
the Sixth Circuit to identify government speech, an approach that in effect
considers a single factor to be determinative. Part IV analyzes a fourpronged test for identifying government speech which has been more
commonly used by various circuits. Part V discusses the proposal by a few
judges and recent commentators that courts should recognize a third
“hybrid” or “mixed” category of speech. Part VI suggests an alternative
approach which I believe explains and reconciles the key Supreme Court
precedents while also providing a more complete and consistent protection
of private speech. Finally, Part VII suggests ways in which this approach
might be used in understanding Supreme Court precedents and resolving
some current legal controversies in both free speech and establishment
contexts.

27

For the most extended recent discussion, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When
Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 675–77 (2008). Other recent
commentators have also suggested or assumed this approach, albeit without extended consideration of
alternatives. See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 10, at 2013, 2022; Helen Norton, The Measure of Government
Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 620–21 (2008).
28
My primary purpose is descriptive. While I do provide a very limited defense of the Court’s
approach—partly in the form of a critique of existing alternatives—a fuller normative evaluation must
await another article. I likewise save for another day the development of a unifying theory that might
explain why the Court sees government speech in each of these three particular situations and not
others.
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
According to accepted wisdom, the government speech doctrine, as
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, had its genesis in Rust v. Sullivan.29
In Rust, federal law prohibited the distribution of certain federal “family
planning project[]” funds to entities that provided abortion counseling or
referrals, or which otherwise encouraged abortion.30 The Court rejected
the claim that the government had selectively withheld funds from a
handful of private speakers due to its disfavor of their viewpoint; instead,
the Court upheld the program as a permissible decision by the federal
government about how it would design its own programs and spend its
own money.31 “‘[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of
a fundamental right,’” said the Court, “‘does not infringe the right.’”32 The
Court saw the funding limitation as a decision about how to use limited
subsidy resources—not as discrimination against a disfavored viewpoint,
but as the inevitable result of defining the scope and limits of a
governmental spending program.33
The Court itself seems to have accepted the common view that the
government speech doctrine originated in its opinion in Rust. Ten years
after Rust, the Court described the case’s implications as follows:
The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the
rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors . . .
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the
holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on
this understanding. We have said that viewpoint-based
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the
government is itself the speaker . . . or instances, like Rust, in
which the government “used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its own program.”34
Lower courts have widely adopted this understanding of Rust as a
leading case on the government speech doctrine—or at least have noted
that the Court has done so.35
According to this accepted wisdom, the government prevailed in Rust
because the funded speech at issue, although conveyed by private parties,
29

500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Id. at 178–80.
31
Id. at 193–94.
32
Id. at 193 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)).
33
Id. at 194–95.
34
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
35
E.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288
F.3d 610, 617–18 (4th Cir. 2002); Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir.
2001); see also ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 378 (6th Cir. 2006) (referring to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Rust as authority when deciding a government speech doctrine case).
30
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was government speech rather than private speech. The funding rules were
part of a larger governmental program to encourage or discourage some
private activity—in Rust, a program to discourage abortion and to
encourage family planning using alternative methods. The funds were
allocated so as to ensure that private speakers would “transmit specific
information”—the government’s message—in support of the governmental
program.36 The “family planning without abortion” message was the
government’s own message, crafted in advance by the government, and the
funds at issue were part of a program designed to promote that kind of
family planning rather than speech in general;37 therefore, the government
was not required to fund messages by private speakers expressing other
viewpoints, conveying other information, or offering other services. The
viewpoint restriction could stand.
The government speech doctrine clearly continues in full strength. In a
pair of subsequent cases alleging compelled speech by means of a forced
subsidy,38 the Court signaled that the presence of government speech
would be determinative.39 These cases involved the claim that the
government had compelled the claimants to pay fees or taxes which were
used in part to fund messages with which the claimants disagreed.
In one of the cases, public university students were forced to pay a
student activity fee, a portion of which was later distributed to student
groups conveying messages that certain students found objectionable.40
The objecting students claimed they were being compelled to speak, in
violation of their First Amendment rights.41 Although the messages were
deemed private speech, the Court upheld the program to the extent that the
government’s criteria for distribution were viewpoint-neutral;42 the Court
noted in dicta, however, that if the objectionable messages had constituted
government speech, viewpoint neutrality in the distribution might not be
required because the government is allowed to tax even dissenting parties
to pay for its own speech.43
In the other case, decided only four years ago, the Court turned this
dictum into law, upholding the disputed tax precisely because the Court
36

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178–79 (stating that Congress passed Title X to ensure that funds would
only be used for preventive family planning and not for abortion).
38
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 555–56 (2005); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).
39
A line of compelled speech precedents holds that the First Amendment Speech Clause forbids
the government under some circumstances to force private parties to pay a subsidy to support the
speech of other private parties with whom the payer disagrees. E.g., United States v. United Foods,
Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233–35 (1977).
40
Southworth, 529 U.S. at 222–27.
41
Id. at 226–27.
42
Id. at 233–34.
43
Id. at 229.
37
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found the funded messages, conveyed by private parties, to be government
speech.44 The federal government had taxed sales and imports of cattle to
fund “beef-related projects” such as “promotion and research.”45 A
substantial amount of the money was used to fund beef advertising,
including ads containing the familiar slogan “Beef. It’s What’s for
Dinner.”46 Some beef producers did not like the ads and complained that
the tax effectively compelled them to speak against their will, in violation
of the First Amendment.47 The Court upheld the tax, however, on the
ground that the ads at issue constituted government speech.48 The Court
was able to reach this conclusion because:
The message set out in the beef promotions is from
beginning to end the message established by the Federal
Government. . . . Congress and the Secretary [of Agriculture]
have set out the overarching message and some of its
elements, and they have left the development of the
remaining details to an entity whose members are answerable
to the Secretary . . . .
Moreover . . . the Secretary exercises final approval
authority over every word used in every promotional
campaign.49
Importantly, the Court said that the finding of government speech would be
the same even if a reasonable viewer would not attribute the message to the
government.50
Meanwhile, in other cases where the government used viewpoint as a
criterion for allocating funds, the Court struck down the funding program
when it found that the funded messages constituted private speech rather
than government speech. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia,51 a public university required the payment of a
student activity fee which was collected in a fund and distributed to student
groups conveying various messages.52 The Court struck down the program
upon finding that the government’s criteria for distributing the funds were
not viewpoint-neutral and that the messages themselves constituted private
speech.53 The Court distinguished Rust—which had also involved criteria
that were not viewpoint-neutral—by noting that in Rust, the funded
44

Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553, 560–64 (2005).
Id. at 554.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 555–56.
48
Id. at 553, 560–64.
49
Id. at 560–61.
50
Id. at 564 n.7.
51
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
52
Id. at 823–25.
53
Id. at 833–35.
45
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messages constituted government speech because “the government did not
create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private
speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.”54
A few years later the Court extended this reasoning in a case involving
federal funding for legal services.55 Federal laws authorized funding for
private organizations providing free legal assistance to indigent clients in
certain kinds of cases, but denied such funding if the organization made
“an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law.”56 The
Court struck down the funding limitation, finding that this restriction
operated as a denial of funding based on the expressed viewpoint of wouldbe recipients.57 The government argued that its funding program was a
program of government speech indistinguishable from the one upheld in
Rust, but the Court found that the program had more in common with the
funding program struck down in Rosenberger:
[T]he salient point is that, like the program in Rosenberger,
[this] program was designed to facilitate private speech, not
to promote a governmental message. . . . The advice from the
attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the
courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even
under a generous understanding of the concept.58
The Court refused to find that the legal services funding program had
created any kind of forum for private expression,59 but this did not change
the outcome. The funding restriction was not a governmental decision
about what message it wanted to pay others to send on its behalf, but rather
a decision to suppress a disfavored message originating with private
speakers:
[I]n the context of this statute there is no programmatic
message of the kind recognized in Rust and which sufficed
there to allow the Government to specify the advice deemed
necessary for its legitimate objectives. This serves to
distinguish [the statute here] from any of the Title X program
restrictions upheld in Rust . . . .60
Thus, the Court in this line of Speech Clause cases has provided some
54

Id. at 833.
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547–48 (2001).
56
Id. at 536–37.
57
Id. at 547–49.
58
Id. at 542–43.
59
See id. at 544 (“As this suit involves a subsidy, limited forum cases . . . may not be controlling
in a strict sense . . . .”); id. at 542 (“[T]he LSC program differs from the program at issue in
Rosenberger in that its purpose is not to ‘encourage a diversity of views’ . . . .” (quoting Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 834)).
60
Id. at 548.
55
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guidance about how to identify government speech. But the guidance has
not often been explicitly applied in other contexts, such as Establishment
Clause claims, in which the Court needed to distinguish between
government speech and private speech. When members of the local clergy
deliver prayers at public school graduation exercises,61 when a private
nonprofit group donates a Ten Commandments monument to a state which
then displays the monument on the grounds of the state capitol,62 when a
student delivers prayers over a loudspeaker to begin each home game of a
public high school’s football season63—in these and other scenarios
evoking Establishment Clause claims, the Court has been called to decide
whether a particular religious message is government speech or private
speech. For the most part, the Court has not set forth unique rules for
identifying government speech in all Establishment Clause cases, nor has it
often referenced the government speech doctrine emanating from Rust and
the other Speech Clause cases. Instead, the approach has been less unified
and intentional. The Court has addressed the issue using fluctuating
descriptors as it evaluated the unique circumstances of each case: from
time to time the Court has expressed concern over the “degree of school
[or governmental] involvement” in the message,64 the degree of
governmental “endorsement” of the message,65 the degree of governmental
“entanglement” in the message,66 the degree to which the government is
“lending its support to the communication of a religious organization’s
religious message,”67 and/or the degree to which a “reasonable observer”
would attribute the message to the government.68
61

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992).
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005).
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
64
Id. at 305 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 590).
65
See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305, 307–08, 315–16 (analyzing the specific facts of the case and
holding that the school district’s policy involves both perceived and actual endorsement of student
prayer); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989) (citing cases involving
governmental “endorsement” of religion and how the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
appearing to take a position on religious issues).
66
See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305–06 (noting that petitioner school district “attempted to
disentangle itself from the religious messages by developing the two-step student election process”);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–34 (1997) (examining whether New York City’s Title I program
resulted in an excessive entanglement between church and state).
67
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601.
68
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (quoting Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315 (noting that “reasonable observers have reasonable
memories” which will cause observers to note the context in which the policy arose); id. at 308 (finding
that a pregame prayer would “unquestionably” be perceived as “stamped with [the] school’s seal of
approval”); see also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687
(1983))). But see Pinette, 515 U.S. at 765–68 (rejecting the contention that the Establishment Clause is
violated whenever a reasonable observer might mistake private religious speech for the government’s
own speech).
62
63
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Nevertheless, in freedom of speech cases, lower courts have accepted
the Rust-inspired government speech doctrine and seem to be aware that
when the government has a message to send, such a message need not be
viewpoint-neutral, and other messages need not receive governmental
support. The difficulty has come in recognizing when the message is the
government’s message. Accepting (and sometimes expanding) the limited
guidance of the Supreme Court regarding the government speech doctrine,
lower courts and commentators have advocated varying approaches for
identifying government speech.
Some of these approaches, which this Article labels “binary
approaches,” more closely track the teaching of the Supreme Court’s
Speech Clause cases by assuming that any particular message must be
either government speech or private speech; they then proceed to classify it
as one or the other. Other approaches, however, find this binary
classification system unnecessarily restrictive and unrealistic; they allow
for a third category of “hybrid” or “mixed” speech—unrecognized thus far
by the Supreme Court—which carries its own unique implications for
judging the powers and duties of government. The binary approaches, in
turn, differ from one another on the question of which factors to consider
in classifying a message as governmental speech.
III. THE BINARY APPROACH USING A SINGLE-FACTOR TEST
Like most federal appellate courts that have addressed the issue, the
Sixth Circuit has adopted a binary approach to classifying speech: a
message may constitute either government speech or private speech, but
not both.69 In one recent case, however, the Sixth Circuit parted ways with
most of these other courts when it held that a message constitutes
government speech whenever “the government determines an overarching
message and retains power to approve every word disseminated at its
behest.”70 While this standard might at first appear to encompass two
distinct factors—whether “the government determines an overarching
message” and whether the government “retains power to approve every
word disseminated at its behest”71—the Sixth Circuit largely ignored the
first of those factors, effectively reducing the test for government speech to
69
When invited to recognize a third category of “mixed speech” in a specialty license plate case,
as the Fourth Circuit had previously done, the Sixth Circuit refused to do so. See ACLU of Tenn. v.
Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376, 380 (6th Cir. 2006).
70
Id. at 375 (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559–67 (2005)). It is
currently somewhat unclear whether the Sixth Circuit views this test as controlling in every case. See
Grosjean v. Bommarito, 302 F. App’x 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2008) (favorably citing Bredesen’s test, but
noting that “the two factors identified in [the Supreme Court case upon which Bredesen relied] were
not . . . held to be exhaustive,” and suggesting in dicta that another relevant factor might be “whether
the speech is attributed to a particular private actor”).
71
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375 (citing Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559–67).
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a question of how much power the government had to approve or veto the
wording and design of the message before it was disseminated.
The case before the court, ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen,72 involved
specialty license plates.73 The state of Tennessee had authorized its
Department of Safety to issue specialty plates to motorists willing to pay a
surcharge, and the menu of available plates was continually expanding; the
general rules were that the Department could make a new specialty plate
available whenever (1) the legislature authorized the particular plate by
name;74 (2) the state commissioner of revenue approved a design for that
plate submitted by a private sponsor;75 and (3) the state received at least
one thousand advance orders for that plate.76 In routine practice,
apparently, when a private organization desired a specialty plate of its own,
the organization lobbied the state legislature to introduce and pass a bill
authorizing the plate.77 By the time of the litigation, the state legislature
had authorized over one hundred different specialty plates, including a
“Choose Life” plate,78 but had rejected a bill, for which Planned
Parenthood lobbied, that would have authorized a “Pro-Choice” plate.79
Recognizing that the key question in the case was whether the “Choose
Life” message constituted government speech, the Sixth Circuit held that
the recent Supreme Court opinion in Johanns80 had established a new
standard for identifying government speech, and that this standard was
controlling. “Johanns stands for the proposition,” said the court, “that
when the government determines an overarching message and retains
power to approve every word disseminated at its behest, the message must
72

441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006).
For a brief description of specialty license plates and the legal issues involved, see supra notes
9–17 and accompanying text.
74
In general, each plate was required to be explicitly listed in a state statute, which of course
required that the legislature approve each particular plate; however, the legislature was only approving
them in concept (such as “Choose Life plates,” “NASCAR plates,” “Mothers Against
Methamphetamine (MAMA) plates,” etc.), usually leaving the particular design to be worked out
between the private sponsoring organization and the state commissioner of revenue, who was granted
veto power over the design. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-4-201 (2009) (outlining requirements of
cultural, specialty earmarked, and new specialty earmarked license plates); id. § 55-4-202 (providing
examples of specialty earmarked license plates); id. § 55-4-210 (“The department is authorized to
administratively issue personalized plates to qualified applicants.”); id. §§ 55-4-305 to 307 (providing
legislative authority for “Choose Life plates,” “NASCAR plates,” and “Mothers Against
Menthamphetamine (MAMA) plates”); Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372 (noting that Tennessee law allows
special logotypes on license plates and that the Tennessee legislature authorized the “Choose Life”
logotype); Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (discussing Tennessee law to issue specialty plates).
75
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201(b)(4) (2009); Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 772.
76
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201(h)(1) (2009); Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372.
77
See Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 773 n.4 (“[P]articipants in the license plate scheme . . . . must
find legislators willing to sponsor a bill.” (quoting Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699, 717
(E.D. La. 2003))); Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372 (noting that Planned Parenthood unsuccessfully “lobbied
for an amendment authorizing a ‘Pro-Choice’ specialty license plate”).
78
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372, 376.
79
Id. at 372; Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 772.
80
See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
73
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be attributed to the government for First Amendment purposes.” After a
rather conclusory observation that Tennessee had chosen an “overarching
message” in this case because the legislature “spelled out in the statute that
these plates would bear the words ‘Choose Life,’”82 the court spent most of
its time on the latter portion of the Johanns formulation, arguing that the
commissioner’s veto power over plate design meant that the state
“retain[ed] power to approve every word disseminated at its behest.”83
While admitting that motorists’ “voluntary dissemination [of the ‘Choose
Life’ message] itself qualifies as expressive conduct,”84 the court found
that the plates themselves contained only government speech and did not
constitute any sort of government-created forum for private speech.85 The
court offered the following support for this finding: (1) the Supreme Court
once characterized the New Hampshire state motto “‘Live Free or Die’ as
‘the State’s ideological message’” when that motto was embossed on all
New Hampshire license plates;86 (2) Johanns and Rust show that the
government does not necessarily create a speech forum every time it uses
private volunteers (or hired hands) to disseminate a governmental
message;87 and (3) finding a forum in cases like this would “render
unconstitutional a large swath of government actions that nearly everyone
would consider desirable and legitimate,” such as government-produced
“Register and Vote” pins worn by private citizens, or postage stamps that
say “Win the War.”88
The court’s reasons for refusing to find a forum seem weak. In Wooley
v. Maynard,89 the New Hampshire “Live Free or Die” case, “Live Free or
Die” was the state motto, and it was embossed on all standard-issue plates.
No motorists paid extra for them or selected that message over others; in
fact, the state required all noncommercial vehicles to bear that message on
their license plates.90 This message was not one of over one hundred stateallowed options for motorists, as in Bredesen;91 rather, it was not optional
at all. Under such circumstances, it is easy to conclude that the message
“Live Free or Die,” which was, after all, the state motto, was government
speech rather than private speech, and that no speech forum had been
81
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375 (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559–67
(2005)).
82
Id. at 376.
83
Id. at 375.
84
Id. at 377.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 377–78 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)); see Wooley, 430 U.S. at
717 (holding that New Hampshire could not constitutionally prosecute car owners for obscuring the
motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates).
87
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 378.
88
Id. at 378–79.
89
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
90
Id. at 707.
91
See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376.
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created simply by embossing all standard-issue license plates with this
message. But that says very little about whether a message represented in
one design appearing on a long menu of various specialty plate designs—a
message that will never be communicated at all unless a motorist chooses
to pay for it—constitutes private speech, or whether such a specialty plate
program creates a forum of some kind for private speakers. Wooley is
simply inapposite. Moreover, while Johanns and Rust may indeed suggest
that the government can use private parties—even volunteers—to
disseminate a message without creating a forum, Johanns and Rust do not
show that the government’s use of private volunteers precludes a finding
that the government program is a forum—only that the use of volunteers
by itself does not make it so. In other words, and perhaps unsurprisingly,
the volunteer element is not alone determinative of whether a forum has
been created, although every forum will include volunteers conveying
messages. But of course, there are several other elements common to
specialty plate programs, elements not present in the governmental
programs at issue in Johanns, Rust, or Wooley, which might indicate the
presence of a speech forum.92
These considerations suggest serious logical flaws in each of the
court’s first two reasons for refusing to find a forum. One suspects, then,
that the driving force behind the Sixth Circuit’s rejection of forum analysis
may have been its third reason: the fear of a slippery slope. This fear
alone, however, is a rather unsatisfying basis for denying that the
government had established a forum. Moreover, the court’s concerns seem
overblown, since government pins, stamps, and the like do not present
many indicators of a speech forum and could be readily distinguished from
specialty plates on that basis.93
Of course, the Sixth Circuit had to dispose of the forum argument in
order to stand by its prior conclusion that the message “Choose Life”
constituted purely government speech.94 In reaching that prior conclusion,
the court assumed Johanns had changed the law, or at least clarified it,
92
These elements might include, inter alia, the fact that the government widely invites (explicitly
or implicitly) private parties endorsing various unknown messages to apply for governmental
permission to use governmental property in sending those messages, the fact that the government does
not tax anyone or spend its own money to promote any particular message, the fact that the impulse to
communicate each message originates outside the halls of government, and the fact that the messages
actually sent under the program are numerous, varied, and sometimes (at least somewhat)
contradictory. Id. at 381–85 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that the
program allows for a variety of views and is designed to promote private speech rather than to convey a
government message).
93
For example, it seems likely that messages appearing on government pins and stamps—
messages such as “Win the War” and “Register and Vote”—originated with the government, not
private applicants. One also suspects that it was not the government’s historic practice to allow dozens
(or hundreds) of private organizations to emblazon their own unique advertising on the government’s
pins and stamps.
94
See supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text.
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95

with respect to all sorts of speech. As understood by the Sixth Circuit,
the Johanns test for government speech, regardless of the content or
context of the message, required a simple determination of whether the
government had (1) “determine[d] an overarching message” and (2)
“retain[ed] power to approve every word disseminated at its behest.”96 But
the Sixth Circuit never seriously applied the first prong. The court found,
without further elaboration, that the first prong was satisfied because
“Tennessee set the overall message and the specific message when it
spelled out in the statute that these plates would bear the words ‘Choose
Life.’”97 Aside from the paucity of the court’s discussion, there are at least
two problems with this analysis under the first prong, suggesting that the
first prong was effectively meaningless as applied.
First, the court inexplicably refused to consider the purpose or message
of the specialty plate program as a whole; instead, it considered only the
message reflected in the short statutory provision authorizing “Choose
Life” plates.98 The “Choose Life” message, reflected in this single statute,
was only one of many messages disseminated by the state’s specialty plate
program.99 In Johanns, the Supreme Court found that the government had
“determine[d] an overarching message”100 only after the Court had
considered the program of which the message was a part—and there was
no indication in those cases that the larger government program involved
numerous messages on varied topics. In Rust, the relevant program was
considered to be “the Title X program,” which was designed “to encourage
family planning” without encouraging abortions;101 the Title X program
funded services and messages consistent with this unitary purpose.102 In
Johanns, the relevant program was a tax-and-spend scheme designed to
“promot[e] the marketing and consumption of ‘beef and beef products,’”103
and some program funds were spent on sending messages consistent with

95
See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 380 (rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s approach to specialty plates
because, inter alia, “the Fourth Circuit opinions . . . are in tension with the intervening case of Johanns.
Johanns sets forth an authoritative test for determining when speech may be attributed to the
government for First Amendment purposes. [The Fourth Circuit] relied instead on a pre-Johanns fourfactor test . . . .”).
96
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
97
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376.
98
See id. at 375–77 (analyzing the questions about government speech and the existence of a
forum by reference only to the portion of the Tennessee Code authorizing “Choose Life” license plates,
not other statutes authorizing other specialty license plates).
99
See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (discussing the numerous types of specialty
plates and how the number of specialty plates was continually expanding).
100
See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Johanns).
101
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
102
Id. at 179–80, 192–93.
103
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (quoting The Beef Promotion and
Research Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–198, § 2, 99 Stat. 1597, 1598 (1985) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 2901(b))).
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this purpose. In Bredesen, however, the “Choose Life” message was not
sent as part of some state program designed to encourage adoptions or
discourage abortions; rather, it was sent as part of a specialty license plate
program—and over one hundred different messages, on various topics,
were sent under the auspices of that program.105 Yet the Sixth Circuit
refused to take account of that program in deciding whether the
government had crafted an “overarching message,” or in defining the
message itself.106 Judging the government’s purpose or message by
reference to the “Choose Life” statute, in isolation, ignores the
governmental program of which that message was a part: it ignores the
governmental actions and operational context which made such statutes
and messages possible.
Second, in finding that the government had “determine[d] an
overarching message” by authorizing “Choose Life” plates, the Sixth
Circuit ignored the true origins of the message, instead resting its finding
of governmental “determin[ation]” on the mere evidence that the state
legislature had passed a statute approving dissemination of a message by
private parties willing to pay.107 This obscures the reality that the message
“Choose Life” originated, not with the state legislature, but with one or
more private sector organizations that lobbied for this particular message
and stood to benefit directly from its dissemination.108 This certainly was
not the case in Rust. And in Johanns, while some associations of beef
producers may have lobbied for the establishment of a pro-beef program in
general terms, the messages themselves were crafted only after the
government had established the program, and those producers’ ties to those
messages were quite indirect.109 Unlike the federal government in Rust and
104

Id. at 553–55.
See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (explicating the conditions under which
Tennessee could authorize a new specialty plate).
106
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107
ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006).
108
In Tennessee, the “principal direct financial beneficiary of the ‘Choose Life’ license plate
plan” was a nonprofit organization called New Life Resources, Inc., which filed a successful motion to
intervene in the Bredesen case. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d 770, 772 (M.D. Tenn.
2004). As of late 2009, twenty-one states offered “Choose Life” specialty plates, and all but one of
these states directed funds from the specialty plate purchase to private organizations; in the remaining
state, purchasers of the “Choose Life” plate were allowed an opportunity to contribute to such
organizations at the time of purchase. Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: “Choose Life”
License Plates (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_
CLLP.pdf; see also Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,
288 F.3d 610, 614 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that, in a Virginia specialty plate program in which “plates
must be specifically authorized by statute,” the ordinary practice was that “a group or organization that
would like to have a special license plate made available to its members contacts a member of the
General Assembly to request that a bill be introduced which, if enacted, would authorize the issuance
of a special plate”).
109
Most importantly, producers did not receive a monetary payment every time the ads ran, or
every time a consumer chose to display the message “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.” Moreover, only a
select few producers—some of whom were chosen by the government—participated in designing the
105
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in Johanns, the Tennessee government “determine[d] an overarching
message” of “Choose Life” (among many others) only after that exact
message had already been “determine[d]” and proposed to the government
by one or more private organizations, who hoped to gain the government’s
approval of their fundraising plan.110 Thus, Tennessee’s involvement
could reasonably be characterized as the mere perfunctory approval of a
message presented to the state from the private sector. Arguably, this is
not what the Supreme Court had in mind in Johanns when it characterized
government speech by noting that “from beginning to end [it is] the
message established by the Federal Government.”111
These problems with the Sixth Circuit’s approach suggest that the
court largely ignored the governmental determination of the message, and
allowed the second prong of its Johanns formulation, regarding
governmental veto power over the final wording, to dictate the
classification of this speech as government speech. Thus, the Sixth
Circuit’s method of identifying government speech in Bredesen represents
a binary approach, using what is in essence a single-factor test. The court
determined that there were two possibilities here—the message was either
government speech, or private speech—and then the court considered only
one factor in making the classification: did the government retain power to
approve the final wording of the message?
Indeed, this determinative prong—whether the government “retain[ed]
power to approve every word disseminated at its behest”—did, in isolation,
point in the direction of government speech. Like the federal government
in Johanns, the Tennessee government (or its agents) held veto power to
approve or disapprove the final wording and design of the “Choose Life”
message in advance of dissemination.112 And this factor, in those cases
where it is combined with the sort of pervasive governmental involvement
present in Johanns,113 makes the message look like government speech.
Without that pervasive governmental involvement, however—involvement
which was not present in Bredesen—governmental veto power over the
final wording of a message could simply be evidence of prior restraint or
message; indeed, some producers and producer associations did not like the ads. Johanns v. Livestock
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553–56 (2005). And while many of the ads did say “Funded by America’s
Beef Producers,” no preexisting private entity was explicitly named in the ads, as they are on many
specialty plates. Id. at 555. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-307 (2008) (Mothers Against
Methamphetamine plates); id. § 55-4-311 (Tennessee Performing Arts Center plates).
110
ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006); see supra 74–79 and
accompanying text (noting that by the time of the litigation, the legislature already authorized over 100
specialty plates, one of which was “Choose Life”).
111
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61.
112
See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d 770, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (“The plate is
effectively designed by its private sponsor, New Life Resources, Inc., and approved by the State.”).
113
See supra notes 44–50, 103–104, 109, and accompanying text (detailing the extent to which
the government was involved in the messaging of the program).
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censorship in violation of the Speech Clause.
This is the central problem with identifying government speech solely
by reference to whether the government exercised veto power over the
message. In contexts where the government did not come up with the idea
of reaching an audience with this particular message, and instead merely
came up with the idea of granting licenses for the private originators of
approved messages to express those messages on government property,
any such “approved” message looks most unlike the government speech
present in Rust and Johanns. In fact, the message looks like private
speech, and the licensing scheme like a government-created forum for
speech. Under such circumstances, the additional fact that the government
held veto power over the message’s final wording seems to indicate
censorship of private speech, not editorial control of the government’s own
speech. Surely, evidence that the government exercised editorial control
over a private speaker’s message in advance of dissemination should not,
by itself, convert otherwise private speech into government speech and
convince judges that a forum never existed. This is especially easy to see
if we imagine the Sixth Circuit applying its approach in other speech
contexts, such as speech in city parks or other traditional public forums.
IV. THE BINARY APPROACH USING THE FOUR-PRONGED TEST
Like the Sixth Circuit, most of the other circuits addressing
government speech issues have used a binary approach—that is, they have
assumed that any given message must be either government speech or
private speech—but they do not adopt the Sixth Circuit’s single-pronged
classification test that prioritizes government approval of the final wording.
Instead, most of them have identified government speech by using some
version of a four-pronged test, originally enunciated as such by the Tenth
Circuit.115
A. The Tenth Circuit Formulates the Four-Pronged Test
According to the Tenth Circuit’s formulation, when classifying a
message as either government speech or private speech, the four factors to
be considered are (1) whether the central purpose of the governmental
program facilitating the message is to promote private views; (2) who
exercises editorial control over the content of the message; (3) who is the
114
At least one federal court has reached a similar conclusion. See WV Ass’n of Club Owners &
Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) (finding that an
inquiry into the degree of a state’s editorial control “confuses rather than clarifies the analysis” in cases
where the central purpose of the government program at issue was not to disseminate a governmental
message).
115
See Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (outlining the
four prongs of the test).
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literal speaker of the message; and (4) who bears ultimate responsibility for
the content of the message.116 The Tenth Circuit claimed to draw the fourpronged test from principles articulated in an Eighth Circuit opinion
involving donor recognitions aired on National Public Radio and, to a
lesser extent, from principles in a Ninth Circuit opinion involving a public
school teacher’s postings on a school bulletin board.117 The court noted
that the Eighth Circuit had alluded to such considerations in finding that
donor acknowledgements, read on the air by employees of a local public
radio station during the station’s broadcast of National Public Radio’s “All
Things Considered” program, constituted government speech, and that
therefore the station could exclude particular would-be donors and their
messages based on viewpoint.118 And the Ninth Circuit had used
somewhat similar considerations to conclude that where a public school
had created a bulletin board for the purpose of supporting Gay and Lesbian
Awareness Month, postings on that board by faculty or staff members
constituted government speech and need not be viewpoint-neutral or
represent a variety of views on the subject.119
The Tenth Circuit used the four-pronged test to evaluate a city’s
holiday display. In Wells v. City and County of Denver, the city and
county governments erected on the steps of a government building a
display including “a creche, tin soldiers, Christmas trees, . . . an array of
lights, . . . a shed containing Santa Claus and his elves,” and other
decorations,120 all of which were owned and maintained by the
government.121 Importantly, the city had built a large sign, which it erected
as a part of the display, containing the message “Happy Holidays from the
Keep the Lights Foundation and the sponsors that help maintain the lights
at the City and County Building,”122 and then listing six corporate
sponsors.123
A private organization, the Freedom from Religion
Foundation, asked permission to have its own “Winter Solstice” sign
erected within the display, but the government would not agree.124 The
Foundation claimed that the “plain language of the [city’s] sign” indicated
that the display as a whole was speech by the Keep the Lights Foundation
and the other private sponsors, rather than government speech, and that the
Freedom from Religion Foundation should have the right to have its
116

Id.
See Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2000);
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000);
see also Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141 (citing Downs, 228 F.3d at 1011–12).
118
Knights, 203 F.3d at 1087–93.
119
Downs, 228 F.3d at 1005–07, 1011–12.
120
Wells, 257 F.3d at 1137.
121
Id. at 1139.
122
Id. at 1137.
123
Id. at 1140 n.4.
124
Id. at 1137–38.
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message included.
The court, however, applied the four-pronged test
and found that the display, including the sign, constituted government
speech.126
In applying the first prong—asking whether the central purpose of the
governmental program facilitating the message is to promote private
views—the court inexplicably focused on the “purpose of the sign” rather
than the purpose of any possible governmental program, such as the
current year’s display or the “program” of erecting holiday displays.127 In
this case, however, the variation probably did not affect the court’s
conclusion; the court found that the sign’s purpose had nothing to do with
promoting private views, and the display “program” as a whole seems even
less connected to private messages than the sign alone.128 In determining
that the sign was not intended to promote private views or messages, the
court pointed to “the City’s complete control over the sign’s construction,
message, and placement,” along with a government official’s testimony
(which the lower court had credited, despite the sign’s actual wording) that
the sign’s purpose was to express the government’s thanks to the
sponsors.129 As to the second and third prongs, the court found that the
government exercised editorial control over the content of the message and
also was the literal speaker because “the City built, paid for, and erected
the sign.”130 Finally, applying the fourth prong of the test, the court found
that the government bore ultimate responsibility for the content of the
display as well as the sign, since the government had provided security and
a fence for the display and was in fact defending the display in this
litigation.131 The court refused to add to the test a fifth factor suggested by
the dissent—“who the listener believes to be the speaker”—but argued that
even if this were one relevant factor, an informed and reasonable observer
would conclude under all the circumstances that the display was
government speech.132
Since Wells was decided, other circuits have adopted its four-pronged
test in deciding whether to classify a message as government speech.
Several of these cases have involved specialty license plates.
B. The Fourth Circuit Adopts the Four-Pronged Test
The earliest of these specialty license plate cases was a Fourth Circuit
case in which Virginia had approved a specialty plate for the Sons of
125

Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1142–43.
See id. at 1141–42 (discussing the purpose of the sign).
128
Id.
129
Id.
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Id. at 1142.
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Id.
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Id. at 1142–43.
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Confederate Veterans (“SCV”) organization but refused to emboss the
plates with the organization’s logo, which included the Confederate flag.133
Although the state routinely approved logos for other organizations’ plates,
it was apparently unwilling to allow the Confederate flag to appear on
license plates because of the message the flag conveys.134 SCV objected,
claiming viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment’s
Speech Clause.135 The Fourth Circuit panel unanimously held that the
messages on Virginia’s specialty plates constituted private speech, not
government speech.136 While noting that the four-pronged test might not
“constitute an exhaustive or always-applicable list,” the court applied the
test anyway and found that all four prongs indicated private speech rather
than government speech.137 Under the first prong the court examined the
“‘purpose’ of the special plate program” and found that the purpose was to
generate revenue for the state while allowing “the private expression of
various views.”138 The court found under the second prong that editorial
control over the content of specialty plate messages rested, as a practical
matter, with the private organizations associated with each plate; whatever
legal power the state had to design or control content was rarely if ever
exercised until this case.139 The court discussed the third and fourth prongs
together in a relatively truncated analysis of who is literally speaking on a
specialty plate and who bears ultimate responsibility for those messages.
After confessing that neither prong suggested a clear outcome in the
context of specialty plates,140 the court progressed to the rather
unremarkable observations that while the government owned the plates at
all times, the plates were mounted on private vehicles, and the Supreme
Court had suggested in Wooley v. Maynard that “license plates . . .
implicate private speech interests”; from these observations, the court
concluded that the third and fourth prongs, like the first and second,

133
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d
610, 613 (4th Cir. 2002).
134
See id. at 623 (“Although the logo restriction itself makes no reference to the Confederate
flag . . . it was the inclusion of the Confederate flag in the SCV’s logo that led to the prohibition against
the use of the logo on the SCV’s special license plate.”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 (W.D. Va. 2001) (“[T]he motivation behind the Commonwealth’s
ban of logos or emblems was to avoid controversy by preventing Plaintiffs from designing a plate that
displays the Confederate battle flag. Out of hundreds of specialty plates in existence, only that bearing
the Sons’ logo is targeted.”); Corbin, supra note 27, at 621 (“[T]he Virginia legislature probably did not
want the divisive image of the Confederate flag linked to the State.”).
135
Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 622.
136
Id. at 621.
137
Id. at 619–21.
138
Id. at 619.
139
Id. at 621.
140
Id. (“The ‘literal’ speaker here might be said to be the license plate itself . . . and who bears
‘ultimate responsibility’ for the speech is unclear.”).
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indicated private speech rather than government speech.
Although the Supreme Court has never adopted the four-pronged test
for identifying government speech, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
has very recently applied it in a unanimous opinion she wrote while sitting
by designation on a Fourth Circuit panel, thus demonstrating the Fourth
Circuit’s application of the four-pronged test outside the specialty plate
context.142 Importantly, the court did not recognize the existence of any
third category of “mixed” or “hybrid” speech, but once again assumed a
binary classification scheme, under which speech was either government
speech or private speech.143 In this case, a city council, which traditionally
had begun each of its meetings with an opening prayer offered by a council
member, implemented a policy requiring all such prayers to be
“nondenominational.”144 One of the council members claimed that the new
policy violated several of his First Amendment rights, including freedom
of speech.145 The court rejected this claim, however, on the ground that the
prayers constituted government speech rather than private speech.
Applying the four-pronged test, the court was first required to determine
the purpose of the program in which the speech occurred. The relevant
“program,” according to the court, was not one particular prayer or one
speaker’s prayers, but rather the policy of having council members offer
prayers at council meetings.146 As to that program, the court readily
concluded that the purpose was governmental because the meetings
themselves served a governmental purpose and the prayers were listed on
the agenda as an “official part” of every meeting; moreover, the content of
the prayers usually included calls for the council to be granted wisdom and
guidance as they performed their official duties.147 The court analyzed the
second and third prongs together, concluding that the new policy itself
evidenced that the government exercised “substantial editorial control”
over the prayers and concluding that the government was the literal
141
Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)). Wooley, of course, did not involve
specialty plates; the case involved a motorist’s claim that a state motto, embossed on all standard-issue
plates, was a form of compelled speech as to those motorists who were required to purchase and
display the plates. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s decision in
Wooley).
142
Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 909 (2009).
143
Id. at 354–55. Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the court cited Sons of Confederate Veterans
but ignored Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004). Rose
was an intervening specialty plate case in which a Fourth Circuit panel had applied the four-pronged
test but had suggested, in at least two of the three separate opinions, that the test showed that messages
on specialty plates constitute neither purely government speech nor purely private speech, and thus fit
into a putative third category called “hybrid” speech. Planned Parenthood of S.C., 361 F.3d at 792–93,
800–01. For a discussion of Rose, see infra notes 215–216, 228–248, and accompanying text.
144
Turner, 534 F.3d at 353–54.
145
Id. at 354.
146
Id.
147
Id.
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speaker because anyone offering such a prayer was only allowed to speak
“by virtue of his role as a Council member.”148 The most difficult question
to answer, said the court, was the fourth prong question of who bears
ultimate responsibility for the content of the message.149 The court noted
that the council members who offered prayers did “take some personal
responsibility for their [council] prayers.”150 But without pursuing this
analysis further or reaching an explicit conclusion under the fourth prong,
the court concluded that on the whole, “given the focus of the prayers on
government business . . . we agree with the District Court that the prayers
at issue are government speech.”151
C. The Ninth Circuit Adopts the Four-Pronged Test
Quite recently, the Ninth Circuit was called to distinguish government
speech from private speech in the specialty plate context, and it too
assumed a binary approach and applied the four-pronged test.152 As in the
Bredesen case,153 “Choose Life” plates were at issue here; but in this case,
rather than disallowing pro-choice plates, the state of Arizona disallowed
“Choose Life” plates.154 Arizona had not authorized any kind of prochoice plates, either, although no evidence showed that any group had
requested them.155 The state government contended that it denied the
application for “Choose Life” plates because it wished to keep all
messages about abortion and abortion rights off of specialty plates.156 The
government further contended that such a restriction was permissible
because any messages on specialty plates (or any other license plates) were
government speech and, in the alternative, that the restriction was a
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limitation on the use of the specialty plate
forum.157 Applying the four-pronged test, the Ninth Circuit panel
unanimously found that messages on specialty plates constituted private
148

Id. at 354–55.
Id. at 355.
Id.
151
Id. The court provided additional support for this conclusion by citing Simpson v. Chesterfield
County Board of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 279, 288 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that similar prayers at
county board meetings, when offered by members of the local clergy selected by the board, constituted
government speech). Curiously, the Simpson case did not mention or apply the four-pronged test
adopted earlier in Sons of Confederate Veterans, nor did it acknowledge the existence of a third,
“hybrid” category of speech, as had been suggested by various opinions in Rose. See supra note 143
(demonstrating that two of the three separate opinions suggested that the four-pronged test showed that
speech on specialty plates was neither purely private nor purely governmental).
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Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965–68 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
56 (2008).
153
See supra notes 69–88 and accompanying text (discussing the Bredesen case, in which the
court found “Choose Life” specialty plates to contain purely government speech).
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Ariz. Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 960–62.
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Id. at 961, 971.
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Id. at 972.
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Id. at 965, 971.
149
150

392

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:365

158

speech, and then went on to conclude that the state’s exclusion of all
viewpoints about abortion and abortion rights was not a viewpoint-neutral
restriction.159
In applying the first prong of the government speech test, the court
analyzed neither the purpose of all license plates nor the purpose of a
single specialty plate design, but the purpose of the “specialty license plate
program as a whole.”160 The court found the purpose of that program to be
“revenue raising”161 and also “providing a forum in which philanthropic
organizations . . . can exercise their First Amendment rights in the hopes of
raising money to support their cause.”162 On the second prong’s question
of editorial control, the court again found for the private organization,
noting that “the idea of a ‘Choose Life’ license plate originated with Life
Coalition,” who also “determined the substantive content of their
message,” despite the state’s authority to set “guidelines for gaining access
to the license plate forum.”163 Regarding the third prong, the court found
that the evidence, while somewhat conflicting, predominately favored
classifying private parties as the literal speakers, despite the government’s
ownership of the plates; the court drew on Wooley for its primary
support.164 And the court concluded under the fourth prong that private
organizations bore ultimate responsibility for the message, since their
organization’s motto and name would appear on the plates and the program
placed the “burden . . . on the nonprofit organization” to “take the
affirmative step of submitting an application” before any message would
be authorized or communicated.165 Thus each of the prongs, according to
the court, supported a finding of private speech.
D. The Seventh Circuit Joins In—Or Does It?
The Seventh Circuit claimed to have employed the four-pronged test—
albeit in a truncated formulation—in a similar specialty plate case decided
at the end of 2008, in which the state of Illinois disallowed a private
organization’s application for “Choose Life” plates.166 Considering and
then rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Bredesen,167 the Seventh
Circuit found:
158

Id. at 965–68.
Id. at 972.
Id. at 965 (emphasis omitted).
161
Id. at 966.
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Id. at 965.
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Id. at 966.
164
Id. at 967.
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Id. at 967–68.
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Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Id. at 862–63. For a discussion of Bredesen, see supra Part III (discussing how the Sixth
Circuit held that a message constitutes government speech whenever the government retains the power
to approve every word of the message).
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[T]he approach of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits [is] more
persuasive. Their multi-factor test can be distilled (and
simplified) by focusing on the following inquiry: Under all
the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the
speaker to be the government or a private party? Factors
bearing on this analysis include, but are not limited to, the
degree to which the message originates with the government,
the degree to which the government exercises editorial
control over the message, and whether the government or a
private party communicates the message.168
In using this test, the court does not seem to have applied the above
factors one by one, so much as generally kept them in mind as it listed a
number of characteristics of the specialty plate program, some of which
indicated government speech and some private speech.169 In the end, the
court determined only that “there are enough elements of private speech
here to rule out the government-speech doctrine.”170
In fact, the very language of the Seventh Circuit’s “test” conceals more
than it reveals. The “approach of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,” which
the Seventh Circuit purported to adopt, was the four-pronged test; yet the
Seventh Circuit refused explicitly to endorse that test.171 Even more
confusingly, after applying its own formulation—a somewhat open-ended
“reasonable person” attribution test—the Seventh Circuit framed its
conclusion negatively: “[T]here are enough elements of private speech
here to rule out the government-speech doctrine; the messages on Illinois
specialty license plates are not government speech.”172 But what are they?
The court held that “private-speech rights are implicated” by the specialty
plate program, but stopped short of saying whether the messages on
specialty plates constituted private speech, hybrid speech, or something
else entirely.173 Nevertheless, the court went on to employ forum analysis
as if the messages constituted private speech, ultimately deciding that
specialty plates were a nonpublic forum174 and yet upholding the state’s
restriction in this case as a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral subject matter
limitation within that forum.175
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E. The Eighth Circuit Applies the Four-Pronged Test to Answer “One Key
Question”
Most recently the Eighth Circuit, which the Tenth Circuit credited with
originating the four-pronged test, has applied the test in deciding its own
specialty plate case involving a state’s refusal to issue “Choose Life”
plates.176 In doing so, however, the court followed the lead of the Seventh
Circuit in characterizing its analysis as a mere inquiry into attribution:
Our analysis boils down to one key question: whether, under
all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully informed
observer would consider the speaker to be the government or
a private party.
Notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit’s
conclusion to the contrary, we now join the Fourth, Seventh
and Ninth Circuits in concluding that a reasonable and fully
informed observer would consider the speaker [of the
message appearing on a specialty plate] to be the
organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who
displays the specialty license plate.177
But unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit answered the “one
key question” of attribution by applying, explicitly and in order, the
elements of the four-pronged test.178 Beginning with the first prong, the
court determined that “[t]he primary purpose of Missouri’s specialty plate
program is to allow private organizations to promote their messages and
raise money and to allow private individuals to support those organizations
and their messages.”179 Next, the court applied the second prong in
pointing out that “[u]nder the Missouri statute, both the state and the
sponsoring organization exercise some degree of editorial control over the
messages on specialty plates.”180 Finally, the court applied the third and
fourth prongs: after noting that private organizations submitted “a general
description of the plate” for approval or rejection by a state legislative
committee, and that the plates thus approved were designed by the
organization and produced without further input from the state regarding
content, the court concluded that “the organizations that sponsor the
specialty plates and the vehicle owners who choose to purchase and
display them are the literal speakers who bear the ultimate responsibility
for the message.”181
Then, going beyond the four-pronged test, the court went on to point
176
Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 871 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Summum v. City of Ogden, 297
F.3d 995, 1004–05 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing how the Eighth Circuit developed the test in Knights).
177
Roach, 560 F.3d at 867.
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out two other factors that would likewise lead a reasonable observer to
attribute specialty plate messages to private speakers. The first of these
was the sheer number and types of different specialty plates issued by the
state: “With more than 200 specialty plates available to Missouri vehicle
owners, a reasonable observer could not think that the State of Missouri
communicates all of those messages.”182 The second additional factor was
the absence of state compulsion:
While Missouri requires a vehicle to display a license plate,
the State does not compel anyone to purchase a specialty
plate. . . . The sponsoring organization must apply for the
specialty plate, and the vehicle owner must choose to
purchase it. Because the “Choose Life” plate is different
from the standard Missouri license plate, a reasonable
observer would understand that the vehicle owner took the
initiative to purchase the specialty plate and is voluntarily
communicating his or her own message, not the message of
the state.183
In the end, based on the four-factor test and the two additional factors,
the court was convinced that specialty plate messages constituted private
speech. Again departing from the Seventh Circuit’s example, the Eighth
Circuit made this conclusion explicit and unequivocal by stating that “the
messages communicated on specialty plates are private speech, not
government speech.”184 Without determining what type of speech forum
the plates constituted, the court found that Missouri’s specialty plate
program was facially unconstitutional because it allowed state officials to
exercise viewpoint discrimination, which is forbidden in every type of
forum, as they approved or disapproved applications for specialty plates.185
F. Difficulties with the Four-Pronged Test
As the foregoing history demonstrates, recent applications of the fourpronged test raise a few nagging concerns about it, in either its original or
modified formulations. First, some of the prongs seem to be unclear, or at
least susceptible to varying definitions. The first prong of the test—the
central purpose of the program giving rise to the message—provides an
example. Although it did not apply the four-pronged test, the Sixth Circuit
in Bredesen had to consider a factor similar to the first prong as it applied
Johanns, and held that the relevant “program” was the particular statute
182
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authorizing “Choose Life” plates; in contrast, the Fourth, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits, applying the first prong of the four-pronged test, considered
the relevant “program” to be the specialty license plate program;187 and the
state has sometimes urged that the relevant “program” is the set of all
policies regarding license plates.188 The four-pronged test apparently does
not specify which program is the relevant one. Another example of
ambiguity can be found in the third prong of the test, requiring courts to
determine who is the “literal speaker.”189 In some speech contexts the term
“literal speaker” will no doubt have a clear meaning, but in many of the
more troublesome cases, one suspects, it will not. Specialty license plates
provide a perfect illustration of the difficulty. Who is the “literal speaker”
of the message on a specialty plate: the motorist, who installed the plates
and drives the car on which they are displayed; the state, who owns and
prints the plates, who regulates their format, and whose name is
emblazoned across the top; or the nonprofit organization, who likely
designed the plate’s background and whose name, logo, and message are
displayed there? Or is the “literal speaker,” as the Fourth Circuit once
suggested with a hint of frustration, the “license plate itself”?190 The words
“literal speaker” are not self-defining in such contexts and tend to create
more difficulties than they resolve.
A second concern, related to the first, is that some prongs of the fourpronged test seem often to point in multiple directions. The “literal
speaker” prong, as noted above, is flawed in this way. As another
example, consider the fourth prong: the determination of who bears
ultimate responsibility for the content of the message. A number of facts
might reasonably bear on that question of “ultimate responsibility,” facts
which may often point in different directions. If “ultimate responsibility”
is simply a question about attribution by a reasonable or average
viewer/listener, we will want to assign “responsibility” to the entity whose
name is affixed to the message (if any, and only one, is so affixed);191 if,
186

ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375–77 (6th Cir. 2006); see also supra notes 98–
106 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s refusal to conclude that the specialty plate
program was the relevant program).
187
See Roach, 560 F.3d at 867; Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir.
2008); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d
610, 619 (4th Cir. 2002); supra notes 138, 160, 179, and accompanying text (discussing the cases that
held that the relevant program was the specialty plate program).
188
See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 965.
189
Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 621.
190
Id.
191
See Ariz. Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 967 (finding that Life Coalition bore ultimate responsibility
for the message, “Life Coalition submitted its motto to be placed on a specialty license plate that
would also identify the organization by name”); see also Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853,
863 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the entire four-pronged test “can be distilled (and simplified) by
focusing on the following inquiry: Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider
the speaker to be the government or a private party?”).
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however, this is also a question about who stands to lose financially if the
message falls on deaf ears, that might suggest another entity altogether;192
if it is also a question of who is liable if the message constitutes a tort or
other actionable wrong, that may suggest a third entity;193 if it is also a
question of who paid for the message or provides protection of the
message, that might suggest yet other groups.194
In light of such ambiguities, it is perhaps unsurprising that reasonable
judges can and do disagree on outcomes under the four-pronged test. The
Tenth Circuit, for example, which originated the test in its four-part
formulation,195 has recently divided over how to apply the test in the
context of a Ten Commandments monument donated to a city by a private
nonprofit group and now owned and displayed by the city in a city park.
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit announced the four-pronged test in Wells,196
the court applied the test to such a donated monument and concluded that
the monument constituted private speech.197 This determination was
adopted by the court, without discussion or application of the four-pronged
test, in another case involving a similar monument five years later;198 Judge
McConnell, however, joined by Judge Gorsuch, dissented from a denial of
rehearing en banc in that case, arguing that the Wells four-factor test
showed that such monuments constitute government speech.199
The court’s decision in that case has now been reversed by the
Supreme Court (without any discussion or application of the four-pronged
test),200 but the disagreement among the judges of the Tenth Circuit
illustrates some of the ambiguities inherent in the elements of the fourpronged test. Judge McConnell believed that the second and fourth prongs
indicated government speech because the government “exercised total
‘control’ over the monuments . . . [and] bore ‘ultimate responsibility’ for

192
For example, given the facts of Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of
Missouri, 203 F.3d 1085, 1089–90 (8th Cir. 2000), one could argue that NPR’s donors bear “ultimate
responsibility” for the donor acknowledgements that NPR broadcasts, precisely because it is the donor
who stands to win or lose financially based on how favorably the message is received by NPR’s
listeners.
193
See Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that “this
litigation [in which the City is a named defendant] is itself an indication that the City bears the ultimate
responsibility for the content of the display”).
194
See id. (finding that the City bore “ultimate responsibility” for the message because, inter alia,
it provided “security for the display, including a fence to guard against theft and protect citizens from
possible electrical hazards, . . . video cameras, . . . motion detectors, . . . and a security guard”).
195
See supra notes 115–132 and accompanying text (discussing the four-pronged test).
196
See id.
197
Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004–06 (10th Cir. 2002).
198
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct.
1125 (2009).
199
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1175–77 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
200
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
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the monuments’ contents and upkeep.” The court had disagreed, holding
that the second prong indicated private speech because “the [private donor
organization] exercised complete control over the content of the
Monument, turning over to the City of Ogden a completed product.”202
And the court thought that while the government might have had “ultimate
responsibility” for the content of the monument after it was donated, the
other three prongs of the test indicated private speech and outweighed the
fourth prong conclusion.203 In particular, the court thought that the first
prong indicated private speech because “the central purpose of the Ten
Commandments monument is to advance the views of the [private donor
organization] rather than those of the City of Ogden.”204 Judge McConnell
did not apply the first prong explicitly, but considering the language of that
prong as quoted in Wells itself,205 one could surely object to the court’s
decision to examine the purpose of the monument rather than the purpose
of the “program”—perhaps the city’s policy about all the monuments
displayed in its parks—which gave rise to the message.206
Finally, Judge McConnell seems to have thought “ownership” of the
“speech”—a factor not expressly listed in the four-pronged test—should be
a determinative factor by itself in cases, like that of the donated monument,
where ownership is not in dispute.207 This approach, however, raises its
own questions. First, is “ownership of the speech” demonstrated merely
by ownership of the medium through which the speech is expressed (here,
the monument and perhaps the park)? If not, what counts as “ownership of
the speech,” such that we can be certain the city owned the speech here?
On the other hand, if ownership of the medium is enough, then Knights, the
Eighth Circuit case that Judge McConnell said represented a more
questionable case of ownership, should have been another easy case of
government ownership of the message (and thus government speech),
because the government owned the radio station used to communicate the
message (and probably the paper upon which the message was written).
And specialty license plates would represent another easy case of
201

Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d at 1177 (McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en

banc).

202

City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1004.
Id. at 1005–06.
204
Id. at 1004.
205
See Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Eighth
Circuit relied on a number of factors: (1) that ‘the central purpose of the enhanced underwriting
program is not to promote the views of the donors’. . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000))).
206
See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “we
must address [the] specialty license plate program as a whole”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 619 (4th Cir. 2002) (considering entire
specialty plate program under first prong analysis).
207
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
203
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government speech, simply because the government clearly owns the
plates. These results seem too easy. Second, and more fundamentally,
why should government ownership of the medium, by itself, convert
otherwise private speech into government speech? If a city makes
microphones available for any speakers who wish to speak in the city park,
one would not typically assume that the speech is government speech,
although the government clearly owns the media of communication.208
Even if each of the four prongs were unambiguous by itself, the
disagreement among the Tenth Circuit judges also reminds us that the test
as a whole still leaves room for judicial doubt in the case of a “prong split.”
How many of the factors must point in the same direction before we can
reach a conclusion? Conveniently, and perhaps not entirely by accident,
courts most often seem to find that the prongs all point in the same
direction;209 but if the result under one prong is an outlier, do the other
three always outweigh it?210 What if two prongs indicate government
speech and two indicate private speech—how are we to break the tie?211
These problems with the four-pronged test are largely practical
problems of implementation. But a more fundamental flaw might lie in
what the test actually measures. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the fourpronged test would lead to a finding of government speech even on the
facts of Rust itself,212 which suggests that the test functions rather poorly as
208
See also id. at 1179 (Tacha, J., responding to dissent from denial of rehearing en banc) (“No
one thinks The Great Gatsby is government speech just because a public school provides its students
with the text.”).
209
See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 965–68; Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 619–
21; Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141–42; Knights, 203 F.3d at 1093–94.
210
See, e.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1005 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
when three of the four prongs indicated private speech, the court resolved “[a]ny doubt” by taking
account of “the after-the-fact nature of the [government’s] effort to claim adoption of that speech”);
Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that a
message constituted government speech when three prongs indicated government speech and evidence
under fourth prong was equivocal).
211
Compare Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d at 1176–77 (McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (arguing that the second and fourth prongs, indicating government speech, would be
dispositive by themselves, regardless of the outcome under the first and third prongs), with Planned
Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793–94 (4th Cir. 2004) (arguing that when the first and
second prongs indicate government speech and third and fourth prongs indicate private speech, a
message constitutes “mixed speech” under four-pronged test).
212
In Rust, federal law prohibited the distribution of certain federal “family planning project[]”
funds to entities that provided abortion counseling or referrals, or which otherwise encouraged
abortion. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–80 (1991). Under the second prong, the government
surely did not exercise much “editorial control” over any given statement by a doctor or employee of
the recipient clinics; private persons were deciding all the details about what to say, except that they
were not to speak about abortion. Under the third prong, the “literal speaker” was clearly the private
physician or clinic staffer. Under the fourth prong, “ultimate responsibility” for whatever was said
about family planning—in the eyes of the law or in the mind of an average listener—arguably rested
with the clinic rather than the federal government. The majority of the four prongs thus indicate private
speech, not government speech. And the first prong, assessing the “central purpose of the program in
which the speech occurred,” might indicate either governmental or private speech, depending on
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an estimation of government speech law.
In a way, the shortcomings of the four-pronged test are not surprising.
In announcing and applying these factors originally, the Eighth Circuit was
focused on evidence that seemed relevant to decide the case before it; the
court does not seem to have considered or intended that these factors
would be used to identify government speech across a range of cases.213
But the Supreme Court has never given a very clear test for identifying
government speech, so when other circuits were subsequently forced to
differentiate government speech from private speech, they latched onto the
Eighth Circuit’s factors, formulated them into a four-pronged test, and
applied that test in a variety of contexts.214 The move is somewhat
understandable; courts obviously prefer to have clear law to apply. But
close inspection of the test shows that it is neither “clear” nor the “law” as
so far announced by the Supreme Court.
V. THE “HYBRID” OR “MIXED” SPEECH APPROACH
Separate from, and perhaps prior to, the question of whether to employ
the four-pronged test is the question of whether to adopt a binary approach
to classifying speech. Most circuits have embraced such an approach,
assuming any given speech is either government speech or private speech.
At least one circuit case, however, suggests that speech might be more
complex, so that in some situations both governmental and private
elements are present and the speech cannot be classified as one or the
other.215 The proposed solution is the recognition of a new category of
blended, “hybrid,” or “mixed” speech, denoting speech that is
simultaneously governmental and private.216 A few commentators, too,
have recently embraced this third category of speech.217 While some who
have adopted this approach favor the four-pronged test for classifying
whether the “program” is defined as the federal grant program or a particular clinic’s program of family
planning services. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (stating the four prongs of the test).
213
See Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94
(8th Cir. 2000); supra note 118 and accompanying text; see also Wells, 257 F.3d at 1155 (Briscoe, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t is not clear whether the court in Knights of KKK was creating a test to be applied in all
government speech cases, or whether it was identifying the factors that evidenced government speech
in that case.”).
214
See supra Parts IV.A.–D. (discussing the formulation of the four-pronged test).
215
See Rose, 361 F.3d at 794.
216
See id. at 794 (Michael, J.) (finding specialty license plates to be “mixed speech” which is
“neither purely government speech nor purely private speech”); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring in
judgment) (finding that “speech can indeed be hybrid in character” because “some speech acts
constitute both private and government speech”); see also id. at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring in
judgment) (finding that “license plate programs . . . ‘really have elements of both private and
government speech’” and that “government speech interests . . . are implicated in the vanity license
plate forum” (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 252 (4th Cir. 2002) (Gregory, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc))).
217
See supra note 27.
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A. Judges Who Have Advocated the “Hybrid” or “Mixed” Speech
Approach
Among federal judges, perhaps the earliest to suggest something like a
hybrid speech category was Judge Mary Beck Briscoe of the Tenth Circuit,
who asserted as she dissented in Wells that “the holiday display is not
solely government speech, but contains private speech . . . .”220 If she had
in mind a distinct third category of speech, however, Judge Briscoe did not
elaborate on it.
The leader of the judicial charge to recognize explicitly a hybrid
speech category has been Michael Luttig, who was at the time sitting on
the Fourth Circuit. As early as 2002, in considering a request for rehearing
in the Sons of Confederate Veterans case dealing with specialty license
plates,221 Judge Luttig wrote separately to assert that while “to this point,
the Supreme Court has always held that speech is either private or
governmental,” this binary approach was the result of “doctrinal
underdevelopment.”222 Judge Luttig continued:
[A]lthough the doctrine may not have previously recognized
such, speech in fact can be, at once, that of a private
individual and the government . . . I believe that, with time,
intellectual candor actually will force the Court . . . to fully
recognize this fact doctrinally . . . .
I am [also] convinced that our court in turn will, upon
reflection, conclude that at least the particular speech at issue
in this case is neither exclusively that of the private
individual nor exclusively that of the government, but, rather,
hybrid speech of both. Indeed, as I have thought about the
matter, I believe that the speech that appears on the so-called
“special” or “vanity” license plate could prove to be the
quintessential example of speech that is both private and
governmental because the forum and the message are
essentially inseparable . . . .223
Two years later, in the Rose case involving specialty plates, Judge Luttig
218

See, e.g., Rose, 361 F.3d at 792–94.
See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 27, at 627 (discussing the possibility of a five-prong test).
220
Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1154 (10th Cir. 2001) (Briscoe, J.,
dissenting).
221
See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text (discussing Sons of Confederate Veterans).
222
Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 245 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en
banc).
223
Id.
219
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continued to defend his conception of hybrid speech—this time bringing
one or two other Fourth Circuit judges along with him—but did not further
explain the contours or implications of the hybrid speech category.224
The significance of recognizing a hybrid speech category depends on
how such a category will be used. What legal standards apply to hybrid
speech? In Sons of Confederate Veterans, Judge Luttig disclaimed any
intent “to foretell those limitations here,”225 but nevertheless opined that
viewpoint discrimination by the government should be forbidden as to
hybrid speech if three factors were present: (1) “the government has
voluntarily opened up for private expression property that the private
individual is actually required by the government to display publicly”; (2)
the private speech component of the hybrid speech is “significant”; and (3)
the government interest is “less than compelling.”226 Believing all three
factors to be present with respect to specialty license plate programs, Judge
Luttig agreed that it was unconstitutional for the state to deny, on the basis
of viewpoint, an organization’s request to include the Confederate flag in
its specialty plate design.227 Subsequently in Rose, Judge Luttig did not
take any further steps in developing a standard to apply to hybrid speech,
instead simply citing his earlier position in Sons of Confederate Veterans
that viewpoint discrimination should be forbidden with respect to the
particular form of hybrid speech appearing on specialty license plates.228
His colleague on the Rose panel, Judge Blane Michael, provided a
fuller discussion. In his own separate opinion, Judge Michael applied the
four-pronged test from Sons of Confederate Veterans, found that the first
two prongs pointed toward government speech and the last two prongs
pointed toward private speech, and concluded from this that the specialty
plate speech was “mixed speech” which was “neither purely government
speech nor purely private speech.”229 Without specifying a test that could
be applied to all such mixed speech, Judge Michael pointed to three
factors, quite different from Judge Luttig’s, which led him to conclude
similarly that viewpoint discrimination would be impermissible with
regard to this particular form of mixed speech: (1) the specialty plates
constituted a limited forum for expression which the state had created; (2)
the government had favored itself as a speaker within that forum; and (3)
the state’s one-sided advocacy might not be apparent to average viewers of

224
225

See supra note 216.
Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 247 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en

banc).

226

Id.
Id.
Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 800–01 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J.,
concurring in judgment).
229
Id. at 793–94 (Michael, J.).
227
228

2009]

IDENTIFYING GOVERNMENT SPEECH

403

230

the plates.
Judge Michael’s opinion raises some troubling questions. First, while
proceeding on the assumption that the four-pronged test is legally binding,
Judge Michael used the test to reach a “mixed speech” conclusion that was
never recognized as a possibility in the precedents which had created the
test.231 Along the same lines, the opinion gives no indication of what
showing is necessary under the four-pronged test to qualify particular
speech as “mixed.” In this case, two prongs were said to point in one
direction and two in the other;232 but is this necessary, or sufficient, for a
finding of “mixed speech”? Was the decisive factor which particular
prongs pointed in a single direction, or the fact that two did, or the fact that
not all did? The opinion leaves all of this unclear.
More important, perhaps, are the particular standards Judge Michael
applied to mixed speech in concluding that viewpoint discrimination was
forbidden. First, there is the finding of a forum: he noted that the
government’s restriction of this mixed speech was suspicious because the
government, in creating a specialty plate program, had created a limited
forum for expression.233 But by definition, one might assume, a speech
forum is a place that contains some purely private speech.234 If the only
messages in the “forum” are mixed speech containing some governmental
component, that in itself might well be proof that no forum exists—at least
not of the sort known to precedent. Judge Michael’s finding of a forum
was based primarily, if not exclusively, on the fact that those carrying the
mixed speech on their cars were volunteers who were not “enlist[ed]” by
the state, as were the doctors in Rust.235 But then why was their speech in
the specialty plate “forum” not purely private speech? Putting aside the
question whether the actual message-bearers in Rust (the doctors)236 or in
Johanns (the media outlets)237 were any less “volunteers” than the
motorists in Rose, one wonders how the finding that the motorists were
volunteers can be held to indicate that the government intentionally created
a forum for speech, but not to indicate the presence of any purely private
speech. Can there be such a thing as a “mixed speech forum,” a forum
230

Id. at 795–96 (Michael, J.).
These precedents are Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of University of Missouri, 203 F.3d
1085 (8th Cir. 2000), Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001), and Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d
610 (4th Cir. 2002). See supra notes 117–43 and accompanying text.
232
Rose, 361 F.3d at 793–94.
233
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
234
See, e.g., U.S. v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 204–06 (2003) (plurality opinion); Int’l
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–83 (1992); Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802–06 (1985) (noting the presence of purely private
speech in a variety of speech forums).
235
Rose, 361 F.3d at 798 (Michael, J.).
236
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179–81 (1991).
237
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 554–55 (2005).
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containing only mixtures of governmental and private speech? If all the
speech includes some governmental component, in what sense is there a
public forum—or a forum of any kind?238
Second, there is the focus on attribution: Judge Michael claimed that
in a mixed speech context, when a state has “favored itself”239 as a
“privileged speaker” within a limited forum (in this case, by authorizing a
plate that promotes the government’s view and refusing to authorize a plate
promoting a competing view)240 and average viewers do not readily
attribute the one-sided message to the state, viewpoint discrimination is
forbidden.241 Since viewpoint discrimination would presumably be
inherent in the governmental component of any mixed speech, this boils
down to the assertion that a government crafting messages for mixed
speech in a forum must clearly identify itself as a speaker. This command,
however, seems contrary to Supreme Court precedent, as it would elevate
attribution to the status of a determinative factor in certain situations.
The Supreme Court, by contrast, has not focused on attribution as a
key factor in identifying government speech or in determining whether
viewpoint discrimination is permissible—in fact, quite the opposite. No
doubt viewpoint discrimination would be less likely if the average listener
would be readily able to link the speech to the government; but the
Supreme Court has pointedly allowed viewpoint discrimination even where
the public does not attribute the message to the government, noting that
“the correct focus is not on whether the ads’ audience realizes the
government is speaking, but on the [government program’s] purported
interference with respondents’ First Amendment rights.”242 True, the
Court in that case had found the presence of pure government speech.243
But under Judge Michael’s analysis, the speech there might well have
qualified as mixed speech instead: the government had funded pro-beef ads
that were designed by a combination of governmental and private actors;
the ads were conveyed through private media outlets as literal speakers;
and the ads often carried a statement announcing that they were “Funded
by America’s Beef Producers,” making no mention of governmental
involvement.244 On any reasonable understanding, the government was
speaking covertly and the ads were not viewpoint-neutral; yet the Court
upheld the arrangement as government speech, rather than striking it down
238

Cf. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206 (finding that neither a public library nor the internet
terminals it provided constituted a public forum because such a library “provides Internet access, not to
‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,’” but for other reasons (quoting Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995))).
239
Rose, 361 F.3d at 795.
240
Id. at 798.
241
Id. at 795–96, 799.
242
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564 n.7.
243
Id. at 563–64.
244
Id. at 553–55, 560–61.
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as forbidden viewpoint discrimination regarding mixed speech.
Judge Luttig’s approach is also problematic, though for different
reasons. His proposal for limiting government control of “hybrid” speech
was tailored to situations in which “the government has voluntarily opened
up for private expression property that the private individual is actually
required by the government to display publicly.”246 In such situations—
assuming the private speech component of the hybrid speech was
“significant”—he would only allow viewpoint discrimination if the
government had a “compelling” interest.247 It is difficult to imagine what
speech would be governed by this rule aside from specialty or vanity
license plates.248 What other government property is legally required to be
displayed by private citizens and also serves as a government-designated
forum for their speech? In fact, one might well argue that even vanity and
specialty plates do not constitute property that any private individual is
required to display publicly; although vehicle owners are required to
display a license plate of some kind, no owner is required to display a
vanity or specialty plate, containing some element of her own speech.249
At best, then, Judge Luttig’s prescription seems to provide guidance for
how to treat hybrid speech only in the narrow context of specialty plates,
and hinges the permissibility of viewpoint discrimination on the somewhat
arbitrary standard of a compelling governmental interest; at worst, it
provides no guidance even in the context of specialty plates.
B. Professor Corbin’s “Mixed Speech” Approach
Some commentators have likewise embraced the hybrid or mixed
category for speech.250 Providing the most extended defense of this
approach, Caroline Mala Corbin has recently proposed the recognition of a
“mixed speech” category, setting forth a five-factor test for classifying
speech as governmental, private, or mixed: “(1) Who is the literal speaker?
(2) Who controls the message? (3) Who pays for the message? (4) What is
the context of the speech (particularly the speech goals of the program in
which the speech appears)? (5) To whom would a reasonable person
attribute the speech?”251 As Professor Corbin conceives this test, there is
245

Id. at 560–67.
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d
241, 247 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc); see supra note 226 and
accompanying text.
247
Id.
248
Indeed, Judge Luttig disclaimed any intention of fashioning a broad rule for all hybrid speech.
See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 246–47.
249
See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e note that the messages
communicated through specialty plates are voluntary, not compulsory. While Missouri requires a
vehicle to display a license plate, the State does not compel anyone to purchase a specialty plate.”).
250
See supra note 27.
251
Corbin, supra note 27, at 627.
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no worry regarding indeterminate factors or a division of conclusions
among factors, for “unless all factors point exclusively to private speech or
exclusively to government speech, the speech is mixed.”252 Applying this
test to specialty license plates, Professor Corbin (perhaps unsurprisingly)
finds the plates to be mixed speech, “fall[ing] squarely in the middle of the
private/government speech spectrum.”253 The literal speaker, she finds, is
“both the government and the private car owner”;254 control over the
message is exercised to a “substantial degree[]” by “both the government
and the individual car owner”;255 funding for the speech rests primarily
with private speakers, “though the government plays a funding role as
well”;256 the speech goals of the program are “inconclusive and difficult to
evaluate,”257 as “is often the case for both government-subsidized speech
and speech in a nonpublic forum”;258 and finally, “[a] reasonable person is
unlikely to attribute the message . . . solely to private speakers or solely to
the government.”259 In short, four of the five factors lead to inconclusive
results, failing to indicate that either the government or a private entity was
speaking alone, and the other factor shows that private speech elements
predominate over admittedly present governmental speech elements.
One suspects this sort of result will not be unusual in applications of
Professor Corbin’s five-pronged test. For example, she asserts that
“religious speech in private schools, such as prayers led by parochial
school teachers, becomes mixed speech when the schools accept
government vouchers.”260 The Supreme Court, of course, has held that
such speech is not attributable to the government in any way, because the
government’s money was distributed to private individuals who then
voluntarily chose to give it to a religious school rather than a secular
one.261 What of religious universities that accept federal grant and loan
funds, such as Pell Grants—does all speech in religious universities (even
speech by the students) become mixed speech because the universities
accept government funds that effectively enable the speech? The beef ads
in Johanns, characterized by the Supreme Court as government speech,
would apparently become mixed speech,262 as would all government252

Id. at 628.
Id. at 640.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 641.
256
Id. at 642.
257
Id. at 643.
258
Id. at 643 n.199.
259
Id. at 646.
260
Id. at 624.
261
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002).
262
The beef ads were funded by a federal government program to encourage beef consumption
and were communicated to the public through private media outlets. The government was seemingly
not the “literal speaker” (prong one) and would not be associated with the speech in the public mind
(prong five), but funded the speech (prong three) and exercised significant control over it (prong two).
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subsidized “private” speech, including the student publications at issue in
Rosenberger.263 Federal and state tax exemptions presumably help to “pay
for” speech in churches too—does all speech from the pulpit become
mixed speech because of prong three?
Other prongs in the five-prong formulation appear to be almost
guaranteed to produce equivocal results (and therefore result in an overall
finding of mixed speech): the first prong, for example, requires judges to
determine the identity of the “literal speaker,” a term which is all too
unclear in many speech applications.264 Prong four, analyzing the speech
goals of the program in which the speech appears, includes the nebulous
terms “program”265 and “speech goals.”266 By the terms of the test, of
course, the inability to reach a clear result under any single prong requires
a finding of mixed speech.267 Thus, Professor Corbin’s approach means at
least this: much speech that courts have previously determined to be
“private” or “governmental” would now be treated as “mixed.”
Professor Corbin admits that her definition of mixed speech “cuts a
wide swath and [would] significantly change First Amendment
jurisprudence.”268 Effectively, however, the change would only be as
drastic as her prescription for what to do with mixed speech once it has
been classified. Along these lines, she proposes applying “some
intermediate level of scrutiny to measures that constitute viewpoint
discrimination on mixed speech.”269 Her test would allow the government
to impose such restrictions only if “(1) it has a closely tailored, substantial
interest that is clearly and publicly articulated; (2) it has no alternate means
of accomplishing the same goal; and (3) private speakers have alternate
means of communicating to the same audience.”270 Applying this
“rigorous intermediate scrutiny”271 to specialty license plates, she
concludes that most types of viewpoint restrictions would not pass the test,
See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text (providing relevant factual references for Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Association, 544 U.S. 550 (2005)).
263
See Corbin, supra note 27, at 690 n.474 (“The Rosenberger Court’s characterization of the
student publication as purely private speech is itself debatable.”). For a brief discussion of
Rosenberger, see supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
264
See supra note 189 and accompanying text. Professor Corbin, in fact, cautions those applying
this prong to be aware that some anonymous speech is hard to trace to any literal speaker, and some
ostensibly literal speakers may in fact be working as agents for someone else—in which case,
presumably, the literal speaker analysis may change. Corbin, supra note 27, at 629–30.
265
For the difficulties inherent in defining the relevant “program,” see supra notes 186–88 and
accompanying text.
266
Professor Corbin notes that for “government-subsidized speech” as well as any “speech in a
nonpublic forum,” the results under this prong will “often” be “inconclusive and difficult to
evaluate”—which means the speech must be classified as mixed. Corbin, supra note 27, at 643 n.199.
267
Id. at 628.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 675.
270
Id.
271
Id.
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but regulations prohibiting hate speech and religious endorsements
would;272 she also suggests that prohibitions on certain other “distasteful”
speech, such as “sexually provocative messages,” might pass the test,
although she does not explicitly apply intermediate scrutiny to those
restrictions.273 In any event, she avers, much of the benefit of intermediate
scrutiny would be to force judges to do explicitly what she believes they
already do implicitly; applying intermediate scrutiny to a wide range of
mixed speech “renders transparent the inevitable balancing [of
governmental and private interests] that courts perform.”274
Applying intermediate scrutiny to such a large class of speech
restrictions, however, is problematic. First, the many forms of speech that
would be swept into this mixed speech category differ from one another in
important ways. There are important differences, for example, between a
federal grant program funding beef ads that is designed to promote beef
consumption,275 on the one hand, and a public university program funding
student pamphlets that is designed to foster the expression of diverse
student views on campus,276 on the other. The former program is a part of
a class of programs in which government has determined to reach an
audience with a particular message and has paid private parties to carry
that message;277 the latter program is a part of a very different class of
programs in which the government has determined to provide resources for
private parties to create and convey their own messages.278 These
differences might be important enough to justify categorical deference to
the government’s viewpoint restrictions within the former type of program
and categorical suspicion of such restrictions within the latter type.279
Second, it is not self-evident that the traditional categorical treatment
272

Id. at 681–91.
Id. at 687–89.
274
Id. at 691.
275
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553–55 (2005).
276
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823–27 (1995).
277
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61.
278
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–29.
279
Indeed, this has been the Supreme Court’s approach to date, as it has applied the government
speech doctrine and forum doctrine, respectively, to these cases. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001) (contrasting the application of government speech doctrine in
Rust with the application of forum doctrine in Rosenberger). And even Professor Corbin does not
advocate abandoning the private speech and government speech categories entirely. See Corbin, supra
note 27, at 671, 692 n.480 (noting that “where the private or government components are sufficiently
attenuated, courts may fairly categorize the speech as purely private or purely governmental”). This is
curious if, as she asserts, those categories simply allow judges to mask a secret ad hoc decision process.
See id. at 677–78 (stating that “categorizing mixed speech as private or governmental” is problematic
because it allows judges to “make a value-informed decision” to label the speech without articulating
how they are balancing the competing interests). In other words, if it is so important for judges to
balance explicitly the competing interests in mixed speech cases, why should they not do so in all
speech cases? Why not subject all speech restrictions to intermediate scrutiny? Might the judgment in
a particular case that “private or government components are sufficiently attenuated” itself be masking
a behind-the-scenes, value-informed balancing process that is never articulated?
273
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simply masks ad hoc judicial balancing that already goes on behind the
scenes—or that if it does, imposing intermediate scrutiny on restrictions of
mixed speech will cause judging to be more forthright or consistent. In an
effort to force judges to show their cards in mixed speech cases, Professor
Corbin would require them to consider explicitly whether a given
restriction is supported by a “substantial” governmental interest and
whether the government could accomplish the same goal by other
means.280 But her evaluation of specialty license plates under this test
provides a perfect illustration of the possibility of continued subterfuge. It
turns out that, in her view, government reasons for banning particular plate
designs are not “substantial” enough unless the designs would endorse
religion (such as, perhaps, a “God Bless America” plate) or convey hate
speech (such as a Nazi plate). Which governmental interests are
prioritized, and which devalued, in reaching such conclusions?281 The
ranking of governmental interests in such an analysis is necessarily tied to
a behind-the-scenes ranking of the harmfulness of particular viewpoints.
Some viewpoints, apparently, are deemed more harmful than others,
making the state interest in restriction (or disassociation) more
“substantial” for some messages than for others. On what basis would a
judge rank various viewpoints according to harmfulness? And would any
judge articulate such a ranking? It seems fanciful to expect that
intermediate scrutiny will force judges to do so; moreover, a ranking of
this sort by a judge or other government official runs directly contrary to
the First Amendment value of viewpoint neutrality toward speech.
C. Difficulties With the “Hybrid” or “Mixed” Speech Approach More
Generally
The “hybrid” or “mixed” speech approach is intuitively appealing
because it recognizes the overlap at the margins between the conceptual
categories of government speech and private speech. By forcing all speech
into one of these two categories, we are bound to generalize and, in the
process, ignore some key differences.
But the hybrid speech category does this, too. In fact, it is the function
280

Corbin, supra note 27, at 675–76 (using the case of specialty license plates to illustrate the
application of the “intermediate scrutiny” test and the resulting advantages of its application in the
courtroom).
281
Regarding the hypothetical rejection of “God Bless America” plates, the state’s interest in
complying with the Establishment Clause probably cannot count as a “substantial” interest, since the
Court has suggested that such governmental endorsements of “God” do not violate the clause. See Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–92 (2005) (holding that the placement of a monument inscribed
with the Ten Commandments is not a violation of the Establishment Clause); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602–03, 657, 671–74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Scalia, JJ.) (cautioning against placing too much weight
on a few religious words that have been used throughout the United States’ heritage). Indeed, our
national motto is “In God We Trust.” 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
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of jurisprudential categories to generalize, and the fact that two (or even
three) categories do so is not in itself a reason to create a third (or fourth),
particularly if the newly minted category does not give judges much
guidance for deciding who wins when speech falls within that category.
Moreover, there is value, confirmed by long experience, in setting up a
presumption against viewpoint restrictions directed against the messages of
private speakers. But to apply that presumption effectively, we must
distinguish between the messages of private speakers and the messages of
public speakers. Arguably, the mixed speech category is not a serious
attempt to do that; it looks more like giving up.
A broad “mixed” or “hybrid” speech category may even allow
government to game the system by actually creating one of the mixedspeech factors in order to convert private speech into mixed speech, thus
forcing increased judicial deference to viewpoint restrictions. For instance,
when the government wants to oppose a private point of view, it could
simply give itself prior approval authority over private speech in some
venue and thus claim that the speech is mixed speech because, under prong
two, the government exerts substantial “control” over the message. In that
case, the restriction itself is being used as evidence that the message is
partially the government’s and that the government therefore has a greater
interest in imposing the restriction. This is circular.
It is not impossible to conceptualize the two-category approach. A
government may deny resources to a few disfavored speakers—and even
forge alliances with competing speakers—without really intending to send
any message of its own. Judges need not sense some element of
“government speech” in such arrangements or shield such viewpointbiased discrimination from normal free speech scrutiny. The danger that
government will use discriminatory allocations of its property to silence a
certain viewpoint or skew debate is no less real when some of the private
competing viewpoints (predictably enough) conspire with the government
to accomplish this result, or at least to advance their own preferred
messages.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THREE KINDS
OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Assuming we wish to continue allowing the government to send its
own messages, it is plainly necessary for judges to be able to identify
government speech across a wide range of Speech Clause cases.
Additionally, to the extent government may violate the Establishment
Clause with its own expression, judges need to be able to identify
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government speech in that context as well. It seems desirable to use one
uniform test for identifying government speech in all contexts, since there
is no obvious reason to define the term differently in Speech Clause and
Establishment Clause cases. As noted in Parts IV and V, neither the fourpronged test nor the hybrid speech approach shows much promise of
helping judges make more uniform or objective decisions, nor do these
approaches track closely the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in the
area of government speech.
This section suggests a simpler approach to identifying government
speech, a test which explains and reconciles the holdings of the Supreme
Court across the gamut of its speech and establishment cases.
Additionally, this section argues that this simpler test offers a more
accurate measurement of what matters in the definition of government
speech and, because it is less subjective than the alternatives, is likely to
result in more judicial consistency as well.
The Supreme Court has found government speech to be present in
perhaps three key circumstances. Accordingly, the proposed test would
pose three questions:
(1) Did the government independently generate the idea of
reaching an audience with this particular message in this
medium?
(2) Was the message expressed in a medium or format
effectively owned and controlled by government and clearly
reserved for the purpose of expressing only those messages
the government regards as its own, never opened to multiple
private speakers for the purpose of raising revenue or
supporting their speech or welfare?
(3) Is there a clear literal speaker who is employed by the
government to send messages on this subject in this format?
If any of the above questions must clearly be answered in the
affirmative, then the message is government speech; otherwise, the
message is private speech. The remainder of this section explains each of
these three circumstances in more detail.
A. Did the Government Independently Generate the Idea of Reaching an
Audience with This Particular Message in This Medium?
A central concept in the whole notion of government speech is the idea

282
See infra notes 381–88 and accompanying text (discussing Establishment Clause violations
caused by certain kinds of government speech).
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that government should be free to express its own messages.
But how
do we know whether the message is really “its own message” or, instead,
that of a private party? This first factor focuses on the most obvious
meaning of “its own message”: that the government came up with the
message in the first place, or at least embraced it enough to generate the
idea of communicating it to an audience in this medium.
In Rust v. Sullivan—the case which, according to the Supreme Court,
contained the first exposition of the government speech doctrine—
Congress came up with the idea of reaching an audience (the clients of
family planning clinics) with a particular message (encouraging family
planning without abortion) through the “medium” of the advice rendered
by physicians and staff working in the clinics.284 The Court clearly
believed all of this was Congress’s idea, a finding which was crucial in
classifying the message as government speech: “The Government can,
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage
certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem
in another way.”285 The Court later described the Rust opinion as showing
that the government can “use[] private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to its own program” and “to promote a particular
policy of its own.”286 Similarly in Johanns, the Court’s conclusion that the
beef ads constituted government speech was anchored in the finding that
“[t]he message set out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end the
message established by the Federal Government.”287 The fact that the
literal speakers were private entities, and the fact that some private actors
exercised some editorial control in the creation of the ads, were factors of
secondary importance, at most: “When, as here, the government sets the
overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is
disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech
doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources in developing specific messages.”288 The fact that the government
“sets the overall message” is surely crucial to a finding of government
speech.
Just as certainly in other cases, the fact that the government did not
“set the overall message” was an important factor in the Court’s
determination that the message constituted private speech. Hence, in
283
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]e have
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”).
284
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–81, 193–94 (1991).
285
Id. at 193.
286
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (emphasis added).
287
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005) (emphasis added).
288
Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
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Rosenberger, the Court found viewpoint restrictions on university-funded
student speech to be improper because the government had not crafted or
“favor[ed]” any particular message but instead had “expend[ed] funds to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”289 Similarly, in
Southworth, although the university made no claim that the statesubsidized student extracurricular speech was government speech, the
Court recognized that viewpoint discrimination might be permissible if
“the state-controlled University’s . . . own funds [were being used] to
advance a particular message.”290 And in Velazquez, while recognizing
that the federal funding program for legal services attorneys was not
designed with the purpose of “encourag[ing] a diversity of views,” the
Court emphasized that viewpoint discrimination was improper because the
program was not designed “to promote a governmental message.”291 The
attorneys receiving this governmental funding would in fact be
representing clients in claims against the government; therefore, the
government could not have intended these attorneys to convey a particular
message set by the government, “even under a generous understanding of
the concept [of governmental speech].”292
Governments might conceivably “set the overall message” either by
crafting the message themselves or by adopting a message or slogan
originally developed by others. In this latter case, however, it is important
to be sure that the government has in some meaningful sense originated the
communication, rather than just selectively subsidizing private
communication, a move that would skew private debate and perhaps run
afoul of existing forum doctrine.293 The origination question attends to this
concern by asking whether it was the government’s idea to use this
medium to reach an audience with the particular message being sent. For
example, if the government wants to embrace the privately originated
slogan “Just Do It” as part of a government program to encourage fitness,
the fact that Nike originally crafted the slogan should not prevent a finding
of government speech when the government pays for the development and
broadcast of television ads containing the slogan. Assuming Nike and the
government reached an agreement as to the government’s use of the
slogan, the crucial factor to consider is whether the government
intentionally embraced the slogan and originated the idea of running these
television ads containing it. If so, then those ads constitute government

289
290

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (emphasis

added).
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Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001).
Id. at 542–43.
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See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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speech.
On the other hand, this kind of government speech will not include the
types of messages that the Supreme Court has held to be private speech in
a government forum. For example, a message expressed by demonstrators
in city streets and parks will not be deemed government speech under
question one because it was the private speakers’ idea, not the
government’s, to reach an audience with this particular message.295 The
government’s idea was not to send an “overall message,” but rather to open
up public property for the expression of various yet-to-be-determined
private messages. Likewise, the messages expressed in student group
publications on public university campuses will not constitute government
speech under question one, because it was not the school’s idea to reach an
audience with the particular messages contained in the publications.296 If
these messages do not count as government speech under the other two
questions either, then the messages would be private speech, and it follows
that governmental viewpoint discrimination in such contexts would be
impermissible.297 By the same token, messages endorsing religion in such
forums would raise no Establishment Clause concerns because there would
be no state action embracing the particular message; the governmental role
was limited to opening up government resources to private speakers on a
viewpoint-neutral and religion-neutral basis.298

294
Of course, other ads featuring the slogan “Just Do It” would not be government speech, to the
extent that Nike and not the government came up with the idea of reaching an audience with those
particular ads.
295
See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757–60 (1995)
(holding that the placement of unattended holiday displays in a state-owned plaza known for public
events was protected private speech); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (“Wherever the title
of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and . . . have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.”).
296
See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (holding
that the government’s rights were not at issue because the expression sprang “from the initiative of the
students, who alone give it purpose and content,” and not the state-controlled university); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833–35 (1995) (noting a difference between
permissible government regulation of state university speech and impermissible viewpoint
discrimination against private student speech, even when it receives university funding).
297
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–30, 834 (reviewing cases in which the Court struck down
viewpoint discrimination against private speech); Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 761 (holding that while
the state may regulate the “time, place, and manner” of private speech in public forums, it is sharply
restricted in regulating “content”); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 678–79 (1992) (noting that governmental discrimination based on viewpoint is forbidden in all
speech forums).
298
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839–42 (noting the acceptability of state university funding
directed to a student religious publication when the university funded all student journals); Capitol
Square, 515 U.S. at 762–63 (reiterating the maxim that private religious speech in a public forum does
not equal the government endorsement of religion).
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B. Was the Message Expressed in a Medium or Format Effectively Owned
and Controlled by Government and Clearly Reserved for the Purpose
of Expressing Only Those Messages the Government Regards as Its
Own, Never Opened to Multiple Private Speakers for the Purpose of
Raising Revenue or Supporting Their Speech or Welfare?
While the first question of the three-question test will likely be
sufficient to identify the majority of government speech, a relatively small
amount of what the Court has considered government speech does not arise
in that way. In fact, in an opinion just issued in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, the Supreme Court has clarified that government speech can also
be created when a government accepts, embraces, and communicates a
donated message.299 Private entities may originate messages and design
communicative media containing those messages, and then donate the
media/messages to the government. If the government chooses to reject
the donation, as it surely would have a right to do,300 then presumably no
government speech arises from the attempted donation;301 but if the
government chooses to accept and display the donated property, the
government now owns and controls the property and may have embraced
communication of the message so strongly that the message of that
particular display ought to be regarded as governmental speech.302 This
would seem particularly true if the display, or the property on which it is
erected, has been clearly reserved for the expression of government
messages rather than being opened to multiple private speakers.
A common scenario is the donated monument. Suppose a private civic
group designs and pays for construction of a six-foot-tall granite
monument containing the text of the Ten Commandments, and then offers
to donate the monument to a state government for display on the grounds
of the state capitol building, where nearly forty other state-owned historical
monuments and markers are displayed over twenty-two acres.303 The state
chooses to accept the donation and allow the display, so the state selects
the precise site for the monument, and the group pays for the erection of
299

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009).
See, e.g., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1089,
1093–95 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000) (holding that a publicly owned radio station
was permitted to reject the donation of funds from the Ku Klux Klan, and refuse to acknowledge such
donation on air, based on viewpoint and reputation of the Klan).
301
See id. In Knights, the Eighth Circuit found that the government’s on-air acknowledgements
of underwriters constituted government speech—but of course, the Klan’s particular message did not
constitute government speech, since the government rejected the donation and refused to acknowledge
the Klan. See id. at 1093.
302
Again, the same message on a different, privately owned display on private property would not
be government speech under this factor, just as a privately originated “Just Do It” ad would not count
as government speech under the first factor. E.g., supra note 294 and accompanying text.
303
The facts presented here are taken from Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681–82 (2005)
(plurality opinion).
300

416

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:365

the monument there and also adds an inscription naming the group and
specifying that the group “presented” the monument to “the people and
youth” of the state.304
The first question of this Article’s three-factor test will not clearly
indicate in this scenario that the monument is government speech, because
it was the private organization, not the government, that independently
generated the idea of reaching an audience with this particular message in
this medium. The government did not come up with the idea for the
monument independently, but only erected it at the suggestion of the
private group. Answering the second question, however, clarifies that the
monument is indeed government speech; the media, both the monument
and the capitol grounds, were owned and controlled by the government and
clearly reserved for expressing only those messages that the government
regarded as its own. The media and format are important. Here, although
the government may (at least implicitly) invite private speakers to
demonstrate in person in its parks or other public spaces, the city has not
even implicitly invited private parties to erect unattended, permanent
monuments there. The format of the park and the monuments standing in
it strongly indicate that unattended park monuments are reserved for
government messages.
The Supreme Court focused on exactly these considerations while
addressing very similar facts in Pleasant Grove.305 The Court noted that
one could assume the public grounds were never opened generally to
private speakers’ monuments for the purpose of encouraging private
speech or raising revenue, and the government did not actively encourage
donations of monuments; every donated monument had likely been
screened by the government, not just to assure that no distasteful message
was present, but to assure that the message was something the government
wanted to say—something “worthy” of being displayed on the grounds.306
The donated monument may have begun as private speech, but under these
circumstances, when the government accepted and displayed it, it became
government speech. The upshot of this determination is that no private
speech rights are violated when the government refuses to accept and
display some other group’s donation; and on the other hand, any religious
endorsements on successfully donated and displayed monuments must be
considered the state’s expression for Establishment Clause purposes. This,
indeed, seems to be the way the Supreme Court has viewed such
monuments even before the most recent term—although in 2005 the Court
determined, on one set of facts involving Ten Commandments monuments,

304

Id.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132–35 (2009).
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Id. at 1132–34.
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2009]

IDENTIFYING GOVERNMENT SPEECH

417
307

that such a state expression did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, the reasoning in Pleasant Grove suggests that a “donated”
display could be considered government speech even if legal ownership of
the donated property itself were less clear, as long as the other
considerations noted above were still present and the government exercised
a sort of effective ownership and control over the display. Thus if a
monument were designed and funded by a private group, and the group
then asked the government for permission to erect it as a permanent fixture
on government property in front of the county courthouse,308 the
government’s affirmative grant of permission would arguably convert the
monument’s message into government speech, whether or not the
government ever became the legal owner of the monument.309
Similarly, the Supreme Court has found an improper governmental
endorsement of religion—which indicates that the government was
expressing something—when a government agreed to allow a private
organization to display a crèche on government property and to store the
crèche in a governmental storeroom when it was not being displayed.310
This case involved both a crèche and a menorah. The crèche was
technically the property of a private Catholic organization called the Holy
Name Society,311 and the menorah was technically the property of a private
Jewish organization called Chabad,312 but both the crèche and the menorah
remained at all times on government property, being stored and maintained
by the government even when not on display, and were decorated by
government employees during the holiday season.313 The menorah was
even assembled, erected, and disassembled by government employees,314
307
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92 (plurality opinion) (referring to monuments on the grounds
of Texas State Capitol as “[Texas’s] Capitol grounds monuments” and upholding the display of a Ten
Commandments monument because “Texas’ display of this monument” did not violate Establishment
Clause (emphasis added)); id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he State sought to reflect
moral principles.”). While I assert that Ten Commandments monuments under these circumstances
constitute government speech, and also that a majority of justices suggested as much in Van Orden, I
express no opinion here regarding the ultimate outcome in Van Orden or the proper application of the
Establishment Clause to such monuments.
308
See Staley v. Harris County, 461 F.3d 504, 506–07 (5th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 485 F.3d
305 (5th Cir. 2007) (referring to the placement of a privately constructed monument at the main
entrance of a courthouse).
309
The Fifth Circuit found that such a display, which contained an open Bible, violated the
Establishment Clause because “the monument . . . had come to have a predominately religious
purpose.” Id. at 515. Since private entities and their messages cannot violate the Establishment
Clause, the opinion seems to be premised on the assumption that the government was speaking by
displaying this monument. The opinion nowhere mentions who legally owned the monument after it
was erected—perhaps because no one knew. The consideration seems to have been irrelevant.
310
ACLU v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655, 657 (3d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
311
Id. at 657.
312
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 587 (1989) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens &
O’Connor, JJ.).
313
ACLU, 842 F.2d at 657–58.
314
Id.; County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 587 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.).
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and the crèche was flanked by a plaque stating that the crèche had been
“‘Donated by the Holy Name Society.’”315 A majority of the Court found
that, under the circumstances, the government had impermissibly endorsed
religion by allowing display of the crèche;316 while a different majority
found that by allowing display of the menorah, flanked by a large
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty, the government had either
endorsed something besides religion,317 or had endorsed religion
permissibly.318 But in any case, the analysis suggests that both displays
involved government speech—that is, governmental endorsement of
something—notwithstanding the fact that the crèche and the menorah were
technically owned by private groups.319
Although it is a closer case, the government’s broadcast of the
messages written by donors in Knights probably also gave rise to
government speech.320 In that case, a government-owned radio station
received monetary donations from a variety of private entities and was
required under federal law to “acknowledge[] on air any individual or
group source of funding for a particular broadcast matter,” although the
acknowledgements had to be “value neutral” and could not “promote” the
donor.321 The announcement might be drafted in the first instance by the
donor itself or by the government, but the wording of all such underwriting
announcements had to be approved by the government before being read
on air by a government employee.322
Not all speech broadcast by public stations is the same type of speech.
The Supreme Court noted two years prior to Knights that “[w]hen a public
broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation
of its programming, it engages in speech activity,” and that “[such]
programming decisions . . . constitute communicative acts.”323 The Court
also held in that case, however, that “candidate debates [broadcast by
315

County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 580 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.).
Id. at 601–02 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, & O’Connor, JJ.).
Id. at 616 (Blackmun, J.).
318
Id. at 662–63, 670–71 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Scalia, JJ.).
319
See infra notes 381–82 and accompanying text; see also Wells v. City & County of Denver,
257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001), supra Part IV.A. (discussing Wells). The holiday display in Wells
seems to have been the property of the government, either donated by private entities or partially
funded by them. See id. at 1137–38. But even if the components of the display, including the sign, had
all been created by private sponsors and donated to the city for display on public property, it is difficult
to believe the court would have concluded under the four-pronged test that the message involved
private and not government speech. See id. at 1141–43 (applying the test and concluding that the
display constituted government speech). And this result would be the same under the second question
of the test this Article proposes for identifying government speech.
320
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1087–89 (8th
Cir. 2000) (stating the facts of the case).
321
Id. at 1088.
322
Id. at 1088, 1094 n.10.
323
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
316
317

2009]

IDENTIFYING GOVERNMENT SPEECH

419
324

public broadcasters] present the narrow exception to the rule”
and
constitute a nonpublic speech forum.325 These results are predictable under
the test this Article suggests. When public broadcasters choose what to
broadcast, the content choices are government speech under question one
of the three-question test, because the government came up with the idea of
reaching an audience in this medium with that content. In analyzing
candidate debates, however, the focus shifts to the particular messages
delivered by each candidate. The government in no way endorses what
each candidate says, simply by broadcasting the debate. The debate—to
the extent it is broadcast by a public broadcasting station—thus constitutes
a government-provided speech forum of some type for private speakers.
Applying the three-question tests yields the same result: the government
did not independently generate the idea of reaching an audience with a
particular candidate’s message (say, decreasing taxes or building a new
road); nor was the literal speaker a government employee; and while the
medium and format in which the messages appeared were effectively
owned by the government, the medium and format were not clearly
reserved for the purpose of expressing government-approved messages.
The more difficult question is the classification of the underwriting
announcements in Knights. The Eighth Circuit found the messages to
constitute government speech.326 The second factor of the three-factor test
suggests this result as well. Factor one would not indicate government
speech because the government did not come up with the idea of reaching
an audience with the particular message drafted by, say, the Smith
Charitable Trust. But under the circumstances, the second factor is
probably satisfied because the government-owned medium and format here
were clearly reserved for the purpose of expressing government messages,
not to raise revenue or encourage private speech. The revenue-raising part
of the analysis is the closest call, but on the whole, the acknowledgement
program does not seem to have been put in place to encourage donations to
the station, but rather to satisfy legal requirements, and perhaps
secondarily, to give donors a “free gift”—akin to the ubiquitous tote bag
offered to donors by a number of charitable organizations.327 The
“message,” in the form of written words on a piece of paper, may or may
not have been “donated” by a private group along with its money, but the
government’s affirmative decision to accept and read the donated
message—along with all the other facts present here, including government
ownership and control of the medium—makes this look like government
324

Id. at 675.
Id. at 676.
Knights, 203 F.3d at 1093.
327
See id. (noting that the program is enforced by federal statute and is an “acknowledgement”
and not a promotion).
325
326
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speech. In addition, the fact that private speakers were never allowed to
speak freely on public radio underwriting spots—value bias and promotion
of products or organizations being forbidden by the government—makes
this program substantially different from governmental programs widely
inviting the public to buy ad space to promote private groups and
messages,328 and suggests that even privately composed underwriting
messages constitute government speech when they are accepted, approved,
and read on air by government employees in order to comply with federal
law.
C. Is There a Clear Literal Speaker Who Is Employed by the Government
to Send Messages on This Subject in This Format?
The first and second questions of the proposed test will likely identify
most of the speech the Supreme Court has called “government speech” in
its cases to date. But the Supreme Court has suggested in Garcetti v.
Ceballos329 that there may be one further way a message could be deemed
government speech. Hence, the third question is included here.
In Garcetti, a deputy district attorney wrote a memorandum to his
supervisors recommending dismissal of a pending criminal case due to
misrepresentations contained in an affidavit that had been used to obtain a
critical search warrant.330 His supervisors decided to proceed with the
prosecution anyway, and the trial court later rejected the defense’s
challenge to the warrant.331 In a subsequent action invoking his rights
under the Speech Clause, the deputy district attorney claimed that after
these events he was subjected to a series of adverse employment actions
which were designed to retaliate against him for the memorandum.332 The
Court rejected his First Amendment claim on the ground that “his
expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy” and
therefore did not constitute protected private speech: “[W]hen public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”333 In
other words, those statements are government speech, not private speech.
This holding fits tolerably well with the government speech doctrine,
at least if one may assume that government employees who speak
“pursuant to their official duties” have been hired by their employers to
convey the government’s messages. In such cases, the employee’s
governmental superiors must be allowed to approve the messages even
328

For a discussion of such programs, see infra notes 354–62 and accompanying text.
547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
330
Id. at 413–14.
331
Id. at 414–15.
332
Id. at 415.
333
Id. at 421.
329
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before they are released, as well as to discipline the employee after
publication if she failed to tailor the message to the government’s
expectations about the content of what is, after all, its own message.334 On
the other hand, if the message does not arise from the employee’s messagesending duties—if the speaker is not employed to send messages on this
subject in this medium—then the message might well constitute private
speech, particularly if it concerns a matter of public interest.335 And of
course, if it is unclear who the “literal speaker” is, the speech cannot be the
kind of speech that the Court found in Garcetti.336
The third factor of the proposed government speech test is designed to
make sure Garcetti speech is identified as government speech, assuming
there might be cases where neither of the first two factors clearly indicate
this. Of course, the speech appearing within a calendar deputy’s
disposition memo will constitute government speech under the first factor
if “the government” may be said to have come up with the idea of
rendering the particular advice contained in the memo; but where a
government employee expresses a viewpoint at odds with that of his
supervisors, as in Garcetti, it will be difficult to reach such a conclusion.
Under the second factor of my test, the memo will constitute government
speech if the medium and format (here, intra-office memos sent by
government employees within a government office) were effectively
owned and controlled by the government and reserved for the purpose of
expressing government-approved messages, not private speech. It might
well be thought that the Garcetti facts indicate precisely this kind of
government speech. But on the other hand, one might argue, the very fact
334
I do not intend to express any view about the difficult cases that may arise in particular
applications of the Garcetti rule—for example, when employment status or duties are unclear. See id.
at 424–25 (noting that the scope of an employee’s duties could be a matter for “serious debate” in
future cases, and noting that speech by academics that is “related to scholarship or teaching” could
present an especially difficult case); id. at 436, 438–39 (Souter, J., dissenting). In such cases, the third
question might not indicate government speech. Similarly, the third question would not indicate
government speech if the identity of the “literal speaker” were unclear in a particular case. For a
discussion of some of the difficulties in identifying “literal speakers,” see supra notes 189–90 and
accompanying text.
335
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419 (“[S]o long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters
of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers
to operate efficiently and effectively.” (internal citations omitted)); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp.
High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 573–74 (1968) (“Statements by public officials on matters of
public concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements are
directed at their nominal superiors.”).
336
No doubt “literal speakers” are difficult to identify in many situations. See supra notes 189–90
and accompanying text (illustrating this difficulty). But this poses no difficulty in prong three of the
proposed test, because whenever a literal speaker cannot clearly be identified, the solution is clear:
there can be no finding of government speech under this prong. In other words, unlike the fourpronged test, the test does not require the identification of a “literal speaker” of every message; the
“literal speaker” factor is not serving as one of several factors to be weighed together in distinguishing
between government and private speech in every situation. Question three merely sniffs out one kind
of government speech: the kind arising when there clearly is a literal speaker employed by the
government and having particular job responsibilities.
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that “rogue memos” like this one are sent belies effective governmental
control of the medium and indicates that not all messages sent in this
medium and format are “government-approved.” Additionally, it might be
argued, the Garcetti Court did not focus on government ownership and
control of the medium, but upon the employment status and duties of the
literal speaker.337 Accordingly, the third factor is offered here to cover the
instance of the employee paid by the government to send government
messages, who then sends messages contrary to the government’s wishes;
the purpose is to make doubly sure that speech sent pursuant to such
duties—even noncompliant speech—is classified as government speech in
cases where employment status and duties to send government messages
are clear.338 Not only does this treatment accord with Supreme Court
precedent, but it is probably necessitated by the whole notion of
government speech. The government needs to be able to assure that those
it employs to convey government speech are doing so accurately; if the
government cannot control the content of its intended messages, the
government speech doctrine would become a nullity.339
VII. USING THE THREE-PART TEST TO UNDERSTAND
PAST AND FUTURE CASES
A. Explaining Supreme Court Precedents
The three-part test for identifying government speech is intended to be
descriptive. I have suggested the test, not just as a straightforward way of
measuring what seems to be the essence of government speech, but also as
a method of describing what the Supreme Court has actually found to be
government speech. In other words, the three-factor test provides a
method of reconciling the Supreme Court precedents. Applying the test to
the Court’s establishment and free speech cases yields results that mirror
those reached by the Court.
1. Private Speech
As a starting point, the Court has been clear that governmental funding
of speech does not always create government speech. The Court has
squarely held that “even in the provision of subsidies, the government may

337
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420–22 (noting that a “controlling factor” in Ceballos’s case was that
his speech was made pursuant to his duties “as a calendar deputy”).
338
See supra note 334 (discussing this aspect of the third factor).
339
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422–23 (“Official communications have official consequences,
creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity. [Governmental] [s]upervisors must ensure that
their employees’ official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the
employer’s mission.”).
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not ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas,’” a holding that only
makes sense if government-funded speech sometimes constitutes private,
not government, speech. Hence, when a federal program disbursed grants
to fund only art which program administrators considered to be of
sufficient artistic merit and sufficiently representative of “general standards
of decency,” the art thus subsidized was deemed private speech and the
funding restrictions were required to be viewpoint-neutral, although no
forum for speech was created.341 Similarly, when a federal program
disbursed grants to pay legal services attorneys to represent private clients
in claims against the federal government, the subsidized attorneys’ speech
was deemed private speech and the funding restrictions were required to be
viewpoint-neutral, although no forum for speech was created.342 And when
the government expends its own funds to acquire books, internet
connections and terminals, or other materials and resources for a public
library or public school library, the Court has indicated that the messages
contained in the materials and resources thus acquired still constitute
private and not government speech, although the library is not a forum for
speech.343 Decisions to remove materials from an existing library
collection therefore must be viewpoint-neutral,344 although the Court has
340
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).
341
See Finley, 524 U.S. at 586–87 (“If the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on
the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a
different case.”); see also id. at 611 (“The Government freely admits . . . that it neither speaks through
the expression subsidized . . . nor buys anything for itself with its . . . grants.”) (Souter, J., dissenting);
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 366 (1984) (holding that a federal statute violated the
Speech Clause by forbidding public broadcasting grants to be distributed to broadcasting stations that
“engage in editorializing”; such editorials are private speech protected by the Speech Clause; and the
funding restriction was too coercive); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 148–58 (1946) (finding
that a postmaster violated the Speech Clause when he exercised authority to revoke second-class
mailing privileges for publications he deemed to be insufficiently advancing public welfare; although
speech contained in second-class mailings was subsidized by government, it was still private speech
protected by the First Amendment, and the postmaster’s content rules were too arbitrary and
restrictive); cf. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1100–01 (2009) (finding that a state
law prohibiting public employee payroll deductions to fund a union’s political activities did not violate
the Speech Clause; although the union’s political activities constituted private speech, the payroll
restriction was viewpoint-neutral); Regan, 461 U.S. at 540 (federal tax regulations did not violate the
Speech Clause by denying certain beneficial tax status to private organizations that devoted a
substantial part of their activities to political lobbying; although the lobbying messages constituted
private speech protected under First Amendment, the regulations were viewpoint-neutral).
342
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–43, 547–49 (2001).
343
See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 203–07 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(noting that internet access, in a public library, bought with public funds, facilitates communication by
private parties but does not constitute a public forum for such speech); see also id. at 236 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]n extreme cases [one could] expect particular [book acquisition] choices [by public
libraries] to reveal impermissible reasons (reasons even the plurality would consider to be illegitimate),
like excluding books because their authors are Democrats or their critiques of organized Christianity
are unsympathetic.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–72 (1982) (plurality opinion).
344
See Pico, 457 U.S. at 870–72 (holding that “local school boards may not remove books from
school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books”).
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suggested that heightened judicial scrutiny is inappropriate in the context
of decisions, necessitated by limited funds, whether to acquire certain
materials in the first place.345
The three-factor test would likewise indicate private speech in each of
the instances above, even if no forum was created. In none of these cases
did the government independently generate the idea of reaching an
audience with any of the particular subsidized messages; nor were the
funded messages expressed in a medium or format effectively owned by
government and clearly reserved for government messages; nor was the
literal speaker a governmental employee. But varying the facts slightly
could yield a different result. For example, if the government expends
funds as a patron commissioning particular works of art for display to the
public on public property, the funded artwork might well constitute
government speech, for two independently sufficient reasons: (1) the
government may have independently come up with the idea for the
particular work of art and for its ultimate display in this medium, before
the work was commissioned; and (2) when the artwork was finally
displayed, the medium and format of the display would be effectively
owned by the government and likely reserved for governmental messages,
not opened to multiple private speakers.346
Of course, when the government does create or maintain a speech
forum, at least some speech within that forum will be private speech,347 and
the restrictions on use of the forum must be viewpoint-neutral.348
Unfortunately, the Court has not been entirely clear about what counts as a
“forum” for these purposes. The Court has distinguished between the
“traditional public forum,” the “designated public forum, whether of a
limited or unlimited character,” and “all remaining public property.”349
Since that enumeration, the Court has also suggested, logically enough,
that there is an important distinction to be made within the latter category
between a “nonpublic forum” and other public property which is not a

345
See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 205 (“Just as forum analysis and heightened judicial
scrutiny are incompatible with the role of public television stations and the role of the National
Endowment for the Arts, they are also incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must have
to fulfill their traditional missions.”); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at 871–72 (“[N]othing in our decision
today affects in any way the discretion of a local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of
their schools . . . . [O]ur holding today affects only the discretion to remove books.”).
346
See Finley, 524 U.S. at 610–11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the permissibility of viewpoint
discrimination in such contexts).
347
See supra notes 233–38 and accompanying text.
348
See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983)
(noting that when governmental property functions as any kind of speech forum, whether public or
nonpublic, the government may not “suppress expression [in the forum] merely because public officials
oppose the speaker’s view”).
349
See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992)
(defining each of the three types of forums).
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forum of any type. The distinction is important because the existence of
a forum—even a nonpublic one—will suggest the presence of private
speech351 and the requirement of viewpoint neutrality,352 which will not be
the case with all public property.
The Court has not always used forum language precisely, a fact which
sometimes poses challenges for understanding the Court’s conclusions and
reconciling those with the government speech doctrine. In Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights,353 a leading Supreme Court case about governmental
programs to sell advertising space, a city sold ad space on public transit
cars to a variety of commercial and non-commercial speakers.354 In
upholding a city rule excluding political advertising from the ad space, a
plurality of the Court stopped short of characterizing the ads as some kind
of government speech, but did state flatly that “[n]o First Amendment
forum is here to be found.”355 Taken literally, that means the ad space did
not constitute even a nonpublic forum. But Lehman was decided a decade
before the forum doctrine was fully announced in Cornelius356 and Perry
Education Association,357 and the literal reading does not square well with
later opinions suggesting that forums are created when public property is
opened to a variety of private speakers, such as advertisers358 or political
candidates.359 Indeed, lower courts have subsequently interpreted the
statement in Lehman to mean “no public forum is here to be found,” and
that advertising spaces such as those at issue in Lehman constitute
nonpublic forums.360 Even the Supreme Court itself has suggested this
350
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998) (noting that when a
public television station aired a debate among political candidates, “the . . . debate was a forum of some
type” and that “[t]he question of what type must be answered by reference to our public forum
precedents” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 677 (“Other government properties are either nonpublic
fora or not fora at all.”).
351
See supra notes 233–38 and accompanying text.
352
See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
353
418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) (plurality opinion).
354
Id. at 300–01.
355
Id. at 304.
356
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804–06 (1985)
(holding that solicitation in the context of the Combined Federal Campaign is speech in a nonpublic
forum).
357
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (finding that an
interschool mail system was a nonpublic forum).
358
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 675, 679 (1992) (finding
airport terminals to be “generally accessible to the general public,” to contain “various commercial
establishments such as restaurants, snack stands, bars, newsstands, and stores of various types,” and to
be “nonpublic fora” for expression); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (finding that an annual
fundraising drive in the federal workplace constituted “a nonpublic forum”).
359
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675–76 (1998) (holding that a
publicly owned television station did not violate the First Amendment when it refused to allow a
candidate to participate in the nonpublic forum of a televised debate).
360
See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965–67 (9th Cir.
1999) (citing Lehman as support for the holding that the advertising space on a public high school’s
baseball field fence was a nonpublic forum); N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123,
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interpretation in a later case. Probably the best reading of Lehman, then,
is that the Court found the approved ads to constitute private speech in a
nonpublic forum. The three-factor test would likewise suggest that the ads
constituted private speech: The government did not come up with the idea
to promote a certain brand of cigarettes or a certain church on public transit
cars;362 nor were the ad spaces clearly reserved for government-endorsed
messages; nor was the literal speaker a government employee.
Many times, of course, the existence of a forum is more obvious.
Hence when a city maintains a public square and allows a variety of
religious and non-religious private demonstrators to express themselves
there, the demonstrators’ messages are private speech (notwithstanding
their location on public property and amidst public buildings), and as such
do not raise Establishment Clause concerns when they endorse religion.363
Moreover, when a public university subsidizes a fund which pays for the
speech of a variety of student groups, the university has created a speech
forum, the funded speech is private speech, and the funding restrictions
must be viewpoint-neutral.364 And when a public school offers its facilities
to a variety of private groups for “social, civic, or recreational uses” but
denies use “by any group for religious purposes,”365 the school has created
a speech forum, the speech in the forum is private speech, and the
restriction forbidding religious uses cannot stand because it is not
viewpoint-neutral.366
The three-factor test would likewise indicate private speech in each of
these instances involving forums. The government did not independently
generate the idea of reaching an audience with any particular message
129 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the Court in Lehman “ha[d] considered the forum non-public”).
Sometimes, where past governmental policies have allowed broad access to the government’s ad space,
courts have even distinguished Lehman and have found the space to constitute a designated public
forum. See Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 255 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“SEPTA has no long-standing practice of prohibiting ads like [the ones at issue in the case]
. . . nor does it have any policy pursuant to which [the] ads were removed . . . . Because we find that
SEPTA has created a designated public forum, content-based restrictions on speech that come within
the forum must pass strict scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment.”); Planned Parenthood
Ass’n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1232, 1233 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
public transportation advertising space became a public forum because the government maintained “no
system of control” over advertisements selected and had “allowed its advertising space to be used for a
wide variety of commercial, public-service, and political ads”).
361
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (noting that in Lehman, “the Court treated the advertising
spaces on the buses as the forum” (emphasis added)).
362
See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300 (listing cigarette companies and churches as
two of the groups that had advertised in the ad spaces).
363
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760–63 (1995).
364
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229–33 (2000);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).
365
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993) (holding
that denying a church access to school premises to show a religious film series violates the Freedom of
Speech Clause).
366
Id. at 391–94.
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appearing in the forum; nor was the literal speaker a governmental
employee; and while the messages were likely expressed in some medium
or format effectively owned by government, the status of that property as a
forum makes it unlikely that the medium and format were clearly reserved
for government messages.
The examples above illustrate that government support and funding of
a message do not always create government speech, but the waters may be
muddied further when it is unclear who really provided the funding. Much
depends on whether we are looking for the immediate source or some
ultimate source. The Court has determined that the source should be
identified as the most immediate one we can find who had real control over
fund allocation. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,367 a case involving public
funding of an educational voucher program which allowed parents to direct
the vouchers to private religious or non-religious schools if they wished,
challengers asserted that the program violated the Establishment Clause
because the program allowed public money to be used to fund religious
expression in those recipient schools that were religious.368 The Court
rejected the claim, holding in essence that the religious expression was
private speech funded with private money, since parents chose whether to
fund it.369 Of course, the money had come to the parents from the
government at an earlier time; but if the parents’ spending choices were
truly voluntary, the source of the religious schools’ funding was the
parents, and the religious speech by private school teachers remained
private. The result is identical under the three-factor test: The government
did not come up with the idea of praising God in the classroom; the
religious message was not expressed in a medium or format effectively
owned by government; and the literal speaker was not a government
employee.
The physical setting or environment of speech can also make it
difficult to determine whether the speech is governmental or private.
Occasionally private speech can be identified even in settings of extensive
governmental control, although the Court has sometimes been sympathetic
to the government’s need to censor such private speech. For example,
when a journalism course in a public high school requires students in the
course to produce a school newspaper, the Court has said that the studentwritten articles in the newspaper constitute private speech370 and the
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536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Id. at 644–48.
369
See id. at 652–55.
370
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–72 (1988) (referring multiple
times to the issue as one involving “student speech” and “personal expression”); id. at 273 (referring to
articles at issue as “student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities”).
368
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newspaper might constitute a nonpublic forum, although it does not
constitute a public forum.372 The Court held that the school is allowed to
exercise a great deal of control over the content of such speech,373 but it is
still private speech. The three-factor test probably points to the same
result, but it is admittedly a bit more difficult to apply here. Government
speech would not be indicated by factors one or three: it was the student’s
idea, not the government’s, to write a newspaper story about the particular
subject (in this case, students’ experiences with pregnancy and divorce),374
and the literal speaker (the student author) was not a government
employee. But factor two is a closer call. Because the government
effectively owned the medium and format of communication (the school
newspaper and school grounds), the question would boil down to whether
this medium and format were clearly reserved for the purpose of
expressing only governmental messages and not opened to multiple private
speakers for their own expression. If the newspaper often contained
student opinions, it would probably be difficult to say the medium and
format were clearly reserved, and on balance this factor would not indicate
government speech either. Even if the conclusion under this factor went
the other way in this close case, however, the error might well be harmless,
because of the Court’s determination that private speech in a public school
newspaper can be subjected to extensive governmental censorship375—the
same result which would obtain if the speech were regarded as government
speech.
2. Government Speech
Where the Supreme Court has found the presence of government
speech, the speech is one of the three kinds listed in the three-factor test.
Some cases of this sort have already been mentioned above.376 In addition
to those, consider a handful of recent Establishment Clause cases in which
the Court found the Clause was violated because of a message.377 Whether

371
See id. at 270 (describing actions of school officials with regard to school newspaper by saying
that “they ‘reserve[d] the forum for its intended purpos[e]’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (emphasis added))).
372
See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 267–70.
373
Id. at 271–73 (noting that when a public school regulates expressive activities that “may fairly
be characterized as part of the school curriculum,” the restriction may be broad and need only be
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
374
Id. at 263 (noting content of articles at issue).
375
See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
376
See supra notes 284–88 and accompanying text; notes 303–39 and accompanying text.
377
I do not mean to suggest that this is the only possible kind of Establishment Clause violation.
It may well be possible for the government to violate the Clause without “government speech.” What I
am arguing is that if the Clause is violated by a message, then that message must constitute
“government speech.”
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the standard used is the Lemon test, the endorsement test, or the
coercion test,380 private speech alone cannot violate the Establishment
Clause;381 a message cannot violate the Clause unless it was the
government’s message.382 In cases where the Court has found that a
particular message violated the Establishment Clause, the three-factor test
would identify the message as government speech. For example, when a
public school scheduled public prayers into the agenda of its graduation
ceremonies and invited a local clergyman to deliver the prayers, even
advising him on the wording of the prayers, the prayers could be
characterized as government speech under the first factor: the government
(that is, a government employee—the school principal—acting in his
official capacity) independently came up with the idea of reaching an
audience with this message in the graduation ceremonies.383 Likewise,
when a county erects a “Foundations of American Law and Government”
378
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (providing that the test requires the
governmental action to satisfy three independent requirements: (1) it “must have a secular legislative
purpose”; (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion”;
and (3) it “must not foster ‘an excessive governmental entanglement with religion’” (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted)). See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859–65, 881 (2005)
(applying the Lemon test); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314–17 (2000) (applying
the Lemon test).
379
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 307–10 (providing a recent application of the
endorsement test).
380
See id. at 310–12 (providing a recent application of the coercion test).
381
See, e.g., id. at 302 (“‘[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.’” (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion))); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (“[P]rivate religious speech, far from being a First Amendment
orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.”).
382
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, has stated a view that at first sounds
contrary to the one I am asserting, but upon investigation, the contradiction is largely illusory. In one
Establishment Clause case, she wrote, “I believe that an impermissible message of endorsement can be
sent in a variety of contexts, not all of which involve direct government speech or outright favoritism.”
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 774 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). On its face,
this statement raises a question as to the meaning of “direct government speech.” If “direct” is not a
significant qualification, one wonders how a government can possibly send any “message of
endorsement” without “speech.” Later in the opinion, however, she clarified her view somewhat:
Where the government’s operation of a public forum has the effect of endorsing
religion, even if the governmental actor neither intends nor actively encourages that
result, the Establishment Clause is violated. This is so not because of . . . mistaken
attribution of private speech to the State, but because the State’s own actions [in
administering the forum], and their relationship to the private speech at issue,
actually convey a message of endorsement.
Id. at 777 (internal citations omitted). Thus, in such situations, Justice O’Connor apparently believes
the state is acting to send a message separate from the message of the private speaker, a message that
endorses what the private speaker is saying. On this understanding, violation of the Establishment
Clause still comes from government speech—in this case, the governmental message of endorsement
sent by the government’s actions in administering the forum. Without necessarily endorsing Justice
O’Connor’s view of how endorsement is to be identified in public forums, I think in the end she is
saying what I am saying: messages that violate the Establishment Clause constitute government speech.
383
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587–89 (1992).
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display in its courthouse, consisting of a framed copy of the Ten
Commandments and eight other framed historical documents of equal
size,384 it is relatively easy to characterize the display as government
speech under factor one and factor two as well, whether or not the elements
of the display were donated to the county.385
Less clear, perhaps, was the nature of a student-led prayer at a public
school football game. In that case, however, the Court emphasized the
unique history of the school’s policies governing such messages. For
many years this public high school had scheduled student-led public
prayers at home football games, and only later—after litigation—adopted a
policy to allow students to vote on whether to have a popularly-elected
student deliver “a brief invocation and/or message” to begin the games.386
The school also promulgated content rules applying to any message thus
delivered.387 A student was elected under this policy and delivered prayers
at the games.388 Under these circumstances, the Court found that the
“prayers bear ‘the imprint of the State’”389 and did not constitute private
speech.390 The outcome would likely be the same under factor one of the
three-factor test: the history at this school indicated that the government
independently came up with the idea of reaching an audience with prayers
over the loudspeaker at home football games, and the latest policy was not
an effort to create a forum for private speakers, but merely the
government’s attempt to assure that the prayers continued.391
B. Future Applications—Specialty License Plates
A uniform method of identifying government speech would prove
especially useful in one set of cases that has recently divided the federal
courts of appeals: the cases involving specialty license plate programs.392
These programs have already been discussed to some extent,393 but it might
be useful to apply the three-factor test to them more directly and suggest
the proper legal resolution of these cases.
License plates vary, as do the state programs established to regulate
them. The proper answer to the government speech question will likely
384

See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 851–56 (1992).
See supra notes 302–19 and accompanying text for a discussion of governmental monuments
and displays and the application of the three-factor test to them.
386
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 295–98 & n.6.
387
Id. at 298 n.6.
388
Id. at 298.
389
Id. at 305 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)).
390
Id. at 310.
391
See id. at 306–07, 309–11, 315 (reaching similar conclusions after analyzing history and
context of policy).
392
See supra note 9.
393
See supra notes 9–17 and accompanying text; notes 72–114 and accompanying text; notes
133–41 and accompanying text; notes 152–85 and accompanying text.
385
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depend on the type of license plate, or even the type of specialty plate
program, at issue. With regard to any particular program or type of plate,
we will want to know whether it involves one of the three types of
government speech thus far recognized by the Supreme Court.
As to standard-issue plates, it is difficult to view the messages
contained there as anything but government speech. Motorists do not
choose to display those messages, since presumably the law requires that
they must; moreover, the government crafted the message and also came
up with the idea of putting it on standard-issue plates. If a private motorist
disagrees with the message, the state has to allow him not to display it—
this is the teaching of Wooley v. Maynard394—but the Court did not reach
this result because the message “Live Free or Die” included some
component of private speech; rather, the Court held that private speech
rights are violated when the government compels a private motorist
personally to convey the government’s own message.395 The messages
contained in the alphanumeric combinations on vanity plates, by contrast,
ought to be regarded as private speech. Although the government owns the
license plate and the government’s name is embossed on it, no one—
including the government—views the alphanumeric combinations (or all
elements of all license plates, for that matter) as a medium or format
clearly reserved for the government’s own messages. And of course the
government did not come up with the idea of putting any of the particular
chosen messages on a license plate.
Specialty plates are the most difficult case of all, but calling them
hybrid speech merely hides the ball. It would be more accurate, perhaps,
to say that specialty plates (like vanity plates) contain some government
speech and some private speech on each plate. The elements of
government speech would include the state name, any state motto or other
design that the state has required for all license plates, and the overall
dimensions, materials, and construction of the plate (to the extent these
elements could be deemed expressive). These are elements which are
present only because the government came up with the idea of making
license plates in this way with these messages. It might also be that
messages honoring or identifying a particular group selected by the state—
say, Purple Heart recipients or firefighters396—could be considered
394

430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
See id. at 715 (“New Hampshire’s statute in effect requires that appellees use their private
property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message—or suffer a penalty.” (emphasis
added)).
396
Tennessee, for example, offers both these plate designs. The state groups its specialty plates
into categories, including “Clubs/Groups,” “Collegiate Plates,” “Disabled Plates,” “Emergency
Management,” and “Military/Veterans.” See Tennessee Department of Revenue, Specialty License
Plates, http://tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/licenseplates/specialty.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
The Purple Heart plate is classified within the “Military/Veterans” category and is available only to
Tennessee residents who can prove that they have been awarded the Purple Heart; there is no charge to
395
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government speech, assuming that these groups did not petition the
government for issuance of the plates and the government was not trying to
give these groups a way to raise money and public awareness for some
cause.397 But when a particular organization’s logo or design appears on a
plate only because the organization came up with the idea of trying to
qualify for the issuance of a specialty plate bearing that design, the design
is not properly viewed as government speech; those logos and designs are
private speech. For one thing, the government did not independently come
up with the idea of putting that particular message on a specialty plate, or
even with some “overall message” to be conveyed by its specialty plate
program. For another, assuming the program allows or encourages private
applications of some sort (whether through legislative lobbying or through
paperwork filed with a state bureaucratic office), the medium or format of
specialty plate designs are not clearly reserved for government messages;
instead, they are open to multiple private speakers for the purpose of
raising revenue for the state and the organization and, to a lesser extent, for
encouraging the speech of private organizations and motorists. Finally, it
is clear that the literal speaker, whoever that may be, is not a government
employee whose job it is to send messages on license plates concerning
subjects like adoption or NASCAR.
These sorts of specialty plate programs are not reasonably viewed as
the state’s bully pulpit for sending its own messages, but rather as a stateregulated forum for the expression of a variety of private messages. The
fact that any such messages must be approved in advance by the state
suggests, not government speech, but the possibility of improper viewpoint
discrimination among private speakers. Using such evidence to show
either government speech or a governmental component of hybrid speech
is to use evidence of viewpoint discrimination as a justification for
the motorist for this plate. See Tennessee Department of Revenue, Specialty License Plates—
Military/Veterans: Purple Heart, http://tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/licenseplates/militaryveterans/
militarydesc.htm#purpleheart (last visited Aug. 31, 2009). The Firefighter plate is classified within the
“Emergency Management” category and is available only to Tennessee residents who can prove that
they are current or retired members of a “bona fide” “firefighting unit.” The charge for this plate is
$21.50, which is the same as the charge for a standard plate. See Tennessee Department of Revenue,
Specialty License Plates—Emergency Management: Firefighter, http://tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/
licenseplates/emergency/emergdesc.htm#firefighter (last visited Aug. 31, 2009). The standard plate is
listed as “Automobile/Motor Home” within the “Miscellaneous” category. See Tennessee Department
of Revenue, Specialty License Plates—Miscellaneous, http://tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/
licenseplates/misc/miscdesc.htm#automobile (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
397
To the extent a qualified private motorist chooses such a plate instead of a standard-issue plate,
the message “I am a Purple Heart recipient” or “I am a firefighter” would also be the private speech of
the motorist. This might be the closest thing to true “hybrid speech.” But that should not affect the
analysis. The fact that the government’s predetermined message happens to be endorsed by a private
speaker should not mean that the government is speaking any less or that it is less free to specify which
of these sorts of messages it will issue in this way. Nor should any of this affect our analysis under the
Establishment Clause; the private speaker has a First Amendment right to endorse religion, but no First
Amendment right to demand that the government endorse religion first, thereby allowing her to join in.
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viewpoint discrimination.
VIII. CONCLUSION
First Amendment principles require judges to differentiate between the
messages of the government and those of private parties. Messages
endorsing religion cannot violate the Establishment Clause unless the
government crafts or adopts the message as its own. And governmental
restrictions on a message’s viewpoint cannot violate the Speech Clause
unless the message is someone else’s.
The distinction between
government speech and private speech makes sense because we want to
allow the government to send its own messages as a participant in the
marketplace of ideas, but we do not want to allow the government to
allocate its vast resources discriminatorily so as to hobble whatever private
viewpoints it disfavors. If this distinction between government and private
speech makes sense, then it should be recognized—even in the hard cases
in the middle.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has recognized the distinction but has
given only limited guidance about how to identify government speech in
questionable cases. Still, what the Court has said can be largely distilled to
three factors that independently indicate the presence of government
speech. Compared to the single-prong, four-pronged, and mixed speech
approaches developed over the past decade by federal judges and
commentators, these three factors seem not only somewhat less subjective,
but also more closely tied to the essence of government speech. In short,
the presence of any one of these three factors tends to show that the
government has developed or adopted, in the words of the Court, a
“programmatic message of the kind recognized in Rust . . . .”398
Governments that do this are indeed sending their own messages.
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Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001).

